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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR
Dear readers,
I am excited to present the fall 2018 issue of The Hilltop Review, which showcases the excellent
research and creative work of graduate students at Western Michigan University. This issue
contains a wide array of topics—from introversion to self-defense to religion’s influence on sexual
affect—that reflect the diverse interests and projects of our academic community. The Hilltop
Review aims not only to provide a platform for these projects, but to bring them into conversation
with the work of graduate students across the University and beyond. Accomplishing this mission
is not possible without strong submissions and attentive readers, and it is my hope that the Hilltop
continues to find both in the future.
The Hilltop offers several monetary awards in recognition of graduate student achievement.
Congratulations to the winners of this issue’s awards! Ryan P. Castillo will receive $500 for the
paper “There’s No ‘Me’ in ‘Imgur’: Applying SIDE Theory and Content Analysis to Viral Posts
on Imgur.com;” Kirsten Welch will receive $250 for the paper “An Application of Risk Analysis
to the Doctrine of Self-Defense;” and Brody Van Roekel will receive $150 for “The
Christianization of Judith: Considering the Hieronymian Translation of Liber Iudith and Jerome’s
Christianizing Agenda.” For creative work, Elizabeth R. Johnson will receive $250 for the
photograph “Filter” and Steven J. Maloney will receive $250 for the poem “Autumn.”
Throughout my first semester as the director and editor of the Hilltop, I have been fortunate to
work alongside fellow students, faculty, and staff whose diligence and wisdom shaped the
following issue. First, I would like to thank former editors Zahra Ameli Renani and Damon D.
Chambers, along with GSA President Amaury Pineda, for helping me transition into this position.
I am also grateful for the authors and artists who submitted their work, as well as the cast of peer
reviewers who worked intently to secure outstanding research and creative work for publication.
Special thanks to this issue’s Editorial Board: Andrew Bassford; Aneudy Mota Catalino; Damon
D. Chambers; Diana Charnley; Alisa Heskin; and Marilyn Markel. Your prompt and insightful
feedback was invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank Maira Bundza, our ScholarWorks
Librarian, for assisting with our online publication and Dr. Charlie Kurth for his guidance in
navigating the life of a journal.
I look forward to working with authors and reviewers as we prepare for the spring issue of the
Hilltop. The deadline to submit work or apply for the position of peer reviewer is February 3 rd.
Please email me at gsa-hilltop@wmich.edu with any questions about the submission or peer review
process. Thank you for your interest and enjoy this issue.
Sincerely,
Adam Waggoner
Director and Editor, The Hilltop Review

There’s No “Me” in “Imgur”:
Applying SIDE Theory and
Content Analysis to Viral Posts
on Imgur.com
Ryan P. Castillo
Abstract
The Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) asserts that social
(i.e., collective) identities are more salient under conditions of anonymity,
prompting “deindividuation” as group members place more focus on community
standards and downplay individual differences. As a result of deindividuation,
social standards become the driving force of group interaction, and the successful
practice of group norms identify individuals’ in-group status while reinforcing the
social identity of the community. The current study applies the SIDE model to the
anonymous image-sharing platform Imgur.com to ascertain whether self-referential
posts are assessed more negatively than other-referential and non-directed content,
and to examine whether posts of varying referential-type occur more frequently
across post-type subcategories. A content analysis of 42 posts to Imgur’s “front
page” revealed that self-referential posts receive significantly more “downvotes”
(i.e., negative assessments) than non-directed content and substantially more
downvotes compared to other-referential posts. Further, self-referential content was
most common within the subcategories of “capitalizing” and “social support,” as
compared to “community identification” and “information / mobilization” for
other-referential, and “visually appealing” and “humor” for non-directed posts. The
findings suggest that the Imgur community engages in voting habits that favor the
maintenance of social identity over the sharing of individuating information,
providing sustained support for the applicability of SIDE in anonymous online
contexts such as Imgur.
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Introduction and Literature Review
Throughout the past several decades, the growing prominence of the
Internet in everyday life has profoundly shaped the ways in which we communicate
and assemble, consequently altering the means by which individuals draw upon
available networks for social, emotional, and informational support. In addition to
major online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, an ever-growing
expanse of niche virtual communities provides users with a wealth of opportunities
for the formation and maintenance of interpersonal ties, both casual and intimate,
including online dating sites, gaming communities, and image- and video-sharing
platforms (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2011; Kobayashi 2010; Maghrabi,
Oakley, and Nemati 2014). Similar to popular social networking sites in terms of
increasing popularity, communicative utility, and the extensive, heterogeneous
user-bases of which they are composed, image-sharing platforms present fruitful
and, to date, under-studied online arenas wherein users can contribute to, and selfselect into, a network of like-minded individuals (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014).
However, unlike dominant social media, image-sharing sites are most often
anonymous in nature, an element of online interaction that not only stifles selfpresentation but raises questions regarding the determination of group membership
in the absence of individuating information (Lea and Spears 1991; Postmes et al.
2001). Given the scarcity of research examining group dynamics in anonymous
online communities, the current study adopts the Social Identity model of
Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) and applies content analysis to better understand
the ways in which users of the image-sharing platform Imgur.com uphold a social
(i.e., collective) identity through their assessment of shared-content.
Imgur.com
Imgur.com is a popular image-sharing website that has been online since
2009. Currently, the platform is ranked as the 13th most-visited site in the U.S.,
hosting over 250 million monthly-active users (i.e., Imgurians) who, in addition to
casual visitors, account for billions of post views per month (Alexa 2018;
Imgur.com 2018). Although Imgur may be broadly categorized as social media
owing to users’ ability to share a wide-range of content (e.g., text, pictures, GIFs,
hyperlinks, etc.), publicly respond to others’ posts, and send personal messages to
other community members, Imgur differs from dominant social networking sites in
two integral aspects: anonymity and bidirectional voting.
Unlike, for instance, Facebook and Twitter, Imgurians are unlikely to share
personal, identifying information over the platform and instead assume anonymous
(and often humorous) usernames, such as “AFrustratedRetailStaffMember” and
“PiggyStarDust.” Further, Imgurians are often admonished for sharing “selfies”
(i.e., photos of oneself) over the platform, and it is widely-understood among the
community that posting such pictures is only acceptable during major holidays,
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particularly Christmas and Halloween. Regarding Imgur’s bidirectional voting
system, users are able to either “upvote” (positively assess) or “downvote”
(negatively assess) any content publicly-posted to the site, including both the posted
content itself and individual comments on a given post. This bidirectional voting is
in stark contrast to, say, Facebook’s “likes” and “reactions,” which do not allow
users to explicitly assess content in an either positive or negative fashion.
Importantly, Imgur’s bidirectional voting system is responsible for filtering posts
through one of three daily-updated content galleries: “user-submitted” (recently
submitted posts with few votes), “rising” (posts that are rising in popularity), and
“most viral” (the most popular posts of the day). While all content publicly-posted
to Imgur.com is archived and remains available unless otherwise removed by the
original poster or site administrators, content that reaches the “front page” (i.e.,
“most viral” content) is most likely to be viewed by users and those casually visiting
the site, though only Imgurians registered to the site are able to utilize the voting
system.
In sum, Imgur constitutes an anonymous social media platform wherein the
popularity of shared content is decided via a bidirectional voting system. The
anonymous nature of the site, however, makes it difficult to determine exactly who
comprises the Imgur community, and how users’ personal characteristics correlate
with posting and voting behaviors. Yet, the few available studies examining group
dynamics on Imgur.com suggest that a “common voice” exists among Imgurians,
such that users exhibit “a generally cohesive tone, characterized by overall
consistent responses, and overt behavior correction” (Mikal et al. 2014:506).
Interestingly, previous research posits that anonymity is precisely the
communicative element responsible for the occurrence of common voice on Imgur,
with the lack of individuating information in tandem with the interactive structure
of the site giving rise to standard communication practices that serve to solidify ingroup membership and strengthen social identity among users (Hale 2017; Mikal
et al. 2014). Thus, regardless of whether objective, identifiable similarities or
differences can be observed between individual Imgurians, a collective identity is
likely upheld on Imgur.com, one that may be indicated by the posting and voting
behaviors of its users.
The SIDE Model
The Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) was
developed as an alternative explanation to deindividuation, or “loss of self,” that
has been meaningfully applied to computer-mediated interaction (Hale 2017; Lea
and Spears 1991; Postmes et al. 2001). Whereas classical deindividuation theory
posits that anonymity among group members causes a loss of self-awareness and
identity, which leads to non-normative behavior, the SIDE model predicts that
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anonymity is likely to result in group conformity (Spears and Lea 1994). The SIDE
model hinges on the assumption that individuals balance multiple identities,
including both individual personalities and social (or collective) identities. In
keeping with identity theory, SIDE conceptualizes identity as internalized
expectations for the social positions held by a given individual and contends that
such internalizations are not only predictive of behavior, but that the probability of
invoking a given identity (i.e., identity salience) is both contextually and
interactively contingent (Lea and Spears 1991; Stryker and Burke 2000). Contrary
to personal identity, which may be shaped by both psychological and contextual
determinants, social identities are constructed and maintained in accordance with
standards predetermined by a group of interest. Consequently, individuals who gain
membership into a given group develop an understanding of group norms and
construct a social identity that corresponds and conforms to the group dynamic
(Stryker and Burke 2000). From the SIDE perspective, deindividuation occurs
when a social identity becomes more salient than an individual identity under
conditions of anonymity (Lea and Spears 1991). Not only does deindividuation
downplay members’ personal motives and characteristics, but its effects prompt
individuals to focus on group activities and social maintenance (Lea and Spears
1991; Postmes et al. 2001). In other words, social norms become the driving force
for group interaction, and the successful practice of group norms identifies an
individual’s in-group status while reinforcing the social context and social identity
of the group.
Previous research has demonstrated the applicability of SIDE in a variety
of virtual settings, including social networking sites, online games, and imagesharing sites such as Imgur.com (Attrill 2012; Hale 2017; Hughes and Louw 2013;
Mikal et al. 2014). Studies of Imgur in particular suggest that the site not only
facilitates deindividuation via users’ anonymity, but that this process is evidenced
by the communication of, and adherence to, community standards in comments and
posted content (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014). Mikal et al. (2014) refers to these
posting and commenting practices as “common voice,” and found that users
respond to posts using formulaic language, such as common terms, repetitious
jokes, and references to previously posted content. Further, Mikal et al. (2014)
found that both posts and comments exhibiting features of common voice are
rewarded with “upvotes” and positive feedback, suggesting that users expect other
Imgurians to understand specific types of responses and intend to capitalize on
references to a shared culture. Findings from Hale’s (2017) study of commenting
practices on Imgur both support and extend Mikal et al.’s (2014) research, showing
that comments conveying disapproval/disagreement with content featured on the
front page of the site are more likely to be sanctioned with “downvotes,” and that
common voice is most evident across particular post categories, including
“community identification,” “capitalizing,” and “humor.”
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Taken together, the findings from previous research suggest that users of
Imgur.com actively maintain a social identity through the use of group-centered
language and the sanctioning of content and comments that fail to reflect shared
community standards, ultimately providing strong evidence for the applicability of
the SIDE model to this platform. However, although past studies have successfully
categorized posts and examined the differential reception of content and comments
that are in accordance with a “common voice” upheld by the community, research
has yet to examine whether posts are assessed differently according to whether the
content explicitly references the original poster rather than the community at large
or no one in particular. In other words, how do Imgurians react to self-referential
information under the effects of deindividuation? The following research questions
and expectations are posed, and subsequently explored through a content analysis
of posts on Imgur.com:
RQ1: Are self-referential, other-referential, and non-directed posts assessed
differently by the Imgur community?
H1: Self-referential posts will be assessed more negatively by the
Imgur community than both other-referential and non-directed
content.
RQ2: Do referential-types vary across post-type subcategories?
Method
Sampling
Because the aim of the current study involves comparing self-referential,
other-referential, and non-directed posts in terms of their relative level of
acceptance by the Imgur community, a constructed week sampling strategy with
elements of stratification was employed. Constructed week sampling was chosen
to avoid potential bias toward posts submitted on certain days of the week or during
significant events, while stratification was incorporated in order to ensure that posts
of each referential-type were represented in the sample. The sampling frame for
this study encompassed a six month period, from December 1st, 2017 through May
30th, 2018. Each day of the week (Monday through Sunday) was selected at random
from the frame to create one constructed week. Once the days were selected, two
posts of each referential-type were purposively chosen from the “gallery” (i.e.,
archived posts) for each randomly chosen day (see below for how posts were coded
into referential subcategories). This sampling strategy resulted in a total of 42 posts
to be analyzed.
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Coding
To test the hypothesis, two a priori categories were developed and used to
code each post: reference-type and negative assessment (i.e., level of acceptance).
Additionally, a third category, post-type, was adapted from previous studies of
Imgur content. To assess intra-coder reliability for both nominal categories in the
current study (reference- and post-type), the analyst re-coded the sampled posts
four days after the initial coding and a percentage of agreement was calculated for
each category; these percentages are reported below.
As previously mentioned, the reference-type category (percentage of
agreement = 100%) includes three subcategories: self-referential, other-referential,
and non-directed. Although content submitted to Imgur.com may incorporate any
combination of images, GIFs (i.e., animated images), and text, posts were coded
into the reference-type subcategories based only on text contained in the post title
or description, since these aspects of posted content are intended for users to
explicitly state the subject/purpose of the post and direct viewers’ attention to
particular elements of the post. Thus, the coding unit for this category was the entire
post, while the context unit was the text contained therein (i.e., post titles and
descriptions). Posts were coded as self-referential if either the title or description
made explicit reference to the original poster (OP). References made by the OP to
him- or herself were indicated either by the use of a first-person personal pronoun
(e.g., I, me, my, mine) or popular acronyms that include personal pronouns, such
as “MRW” (“my reaction when”) or “TIL” (today I learned). Conversely, posts
were coded as other-referential if either the post title or description included a
second- (i.e., you, your, yours) or third-person pronoun (e.g., he she, they, them),
or made use of a first-person plural pronoun (e.g., us, we, ours). Non-directed posts
were those that made no explicit reference to the OP or other individuals/groups
within the post title/description. Table 1 below shows several examples of post titles
and descriptions used to code posts by reference-type.
Table 1. Examples of Post Titles/Descriptions Coded for Reference-Type.
Reference-Type
Example
Self-referential
“Had one of those I hate my job days,
then I read this…” (title)
“Why I don’t take selfies” (title)
“My first and last selfie.” (description)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Other-referential

“Because you
(title/description)

asked

for

it..”

“Some weird-ass music videos for you
freaks in usersub” (title)
“Expect the unexpected” (title)

Non-directed

“Santa made out of chocolate” (title)
“Danny DeVit..OHHHH” (title)
Because posts were sampled from Imgur’s “most viral” page for each day
selected into the constructed week, incorporating upvotes into a measure assessing
relative acceptance would not be expected to yield meaningful results. In other
words, the posts sampled in the current study had already been well-received by the
Imgur community and, for this reason, the relative acceptance of each post was best
indicated by how poorly it was received when compared to other “viral” content.
Thus, rather than “level of acceptance”, the category negative assessment was
measured by calculating the number of downvotes per 1,000 views. No percentage
of agreement was calculated for this category given the objective values used to
compute negative assessment scores.
In addition to the two categories developed for the purposes of this study, a
third category, post-type (percentage of agreement = 95.23%), was adapted from
previous content analyses of Imgur postings (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014). Mikal
et al. (2014) identified six categories under which content posted to Imgur can be
coded, including: community identification (inside jokes, popular interests,
community policing, shared experience), social support (social support,
confessions), capitalizing (positive experience, original art), humor (general
humor), visually appealing, and information / mobilization. However, in the current
study, rather than treating each of these as separate categories and allowing for
cross-coding of Imgur content under two or more of these types, each of Mikal et
al.’s (2014) original categories were treated as subcategories of post-type in order
to maintain mutual exclusivity. The coding unit for this category was the entire post
and, to code for post-type, all content contained in each post was taken as the unit
of context; in other words, unlike the reference-type category, the post title,
description, and body (i.e., pictures, GIFs, etc.) were used to categorize the posts.
In considering the graphical displays when coding into the post-type subcategories,
each image/GIF was scanned for indicators that could be reasonably subsumed
under one of the six headings. For example, a GIF of a wide-eyed dog stumbling
around a living room under the heading “Morphine is a hell of a drug” was
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understood as an attempt at humoring the Imgur community. On the other hand, a
post titled “Achieved my 3-year goal” showing a before-and-after picture of a man
who had lost a significant amount of weight clearly reflects a positive experience
that, consequently, would be coded under the “capitalizing” subcategory. In cases
where categorization was not as obvious, such as a GIF of a bee being offered a
small amount of liquid through a straw with the heading “Giving a bee sugar water
on a hot day,” the post descriptions were helpful in coming to a coding decision; in
this case, while the post might have been considered either “information /
mobilization” (by showing how to feed a bee sugar water) or “capitalizing” (by
depicting the positive experience of saving the bee), the caption stating “video
credit: the bee rescuer is Reddit [user] BadBoiJackson” led to the decision to code
the post as the latter, with use of the term “rescuer” indicating someone’s
(BadBoiJackson’s) positive experience. Figure 1 below presents an example of how
post titles, descriptions, and graphical content were used to code posts into each
post-type subcategory.
Title: “A going away gift from one of the staff. Please help me embarrass him by
making him internet famous.”

Description: “I just left my employment to move to Brazil. My staff gave me an
amazing going away party. This wonderful gem was given to me on my last day.
Not only will it haunt my dreams, but I don’t think I will be able to achieve an
erection ever again. Please help me repay him by making him internet famous.”
Figure 1. Example of Post Coded as “Information / Mobilization”.
Note: underlined words taken as indicators of the post-type subcategory

8

Results
In total, 14 posts of each referential-type were coded, resulting in a total of
42 posts analyzed. Descriptive statistics for post-type, referential-type by post-type,
and negative assessment are shown in Figures 2 and 3, and Table 2, respectively.
As shown below, the most common post-type subcategory was “humor” (n = 19,
45.2%), followed by “capitalizing” (n = 8, 19%), “community identification” (n =
5, 11.9%) and “information / mobilization” (11.9%), “visually appealing” (n = 4,
9.5%), and “social support” (n = 1, 2.4%). Non-directed posts were the most
common within both the “humor” (n = 8) and “visually appealing (n = 3)
subcategories, occurred less frequently under “capitalizing” (n = 2) and
“information / mobilization” (n = 1), and were not observed within the “community
identification” and “social support” subcategories. Self-referential posts were the
most frequent within the “capitalizing” subcategory (n = 5), the second most
commonly occurring under both “humor” (n = 6) and “community identification”
(n = 2), and were the only referential-type to occur within the “social support”
subcategory (n = 1); no self-referential posts were coded as either “visually
appealing” or “information / mobilization.” Finally, other-referential was the most
commonly coded reference-type within the “community identification” (n = 3) and
“information / mobilization” (n = 4) subcategories, occurred frequently under
“humor” (n = 5), and was the least common within the “capitalizing” (n = 1) and
“visually appealing” (n = 1) subcategories; no other-referential posts were coded as
“social support.”
20
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Figure 2. Post Type Frequencies.
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Figure 3. Post Type by Referential Type.
Regarding negative assessment, self-referential posts received the highest
number of downvotes per 1,000 views (.760), followed by other-referential (.541),
and non-directed posts (.365), lending support to the research expectation (see
Table 2 below). The difference in the mean number of downvotes per 1,000 views
was statistically significant between self-referential and non-directed posts (t =
3.349, p < .01), lending additional support to the hypothesis; as an aside, a
significant difference was also observed between other-referential and non-directed
content (t = 1.746, p < .10). However, no significant difference was found between
self- and other-referential posts with regards to negative assessment, though this
difference approached statistical significance (p = .105); it is likely that this
nonsignificant finding can be attributed to the considerably small sample size in the
current study (n = 42). A two-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant
interaction effects among the reference- and post-type categories on the downvote
rate. Overall, then, the findings regarding negative assessment support the research
expectation that self-referential posts are assessed more negatively by the Imgur
community.
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Table 2. Mean Downvotes per 1,000 Views (Negative Assessment) for
Referential- and Post-Type Subcategories.
Category
Mean Downvotes per 1,000 Views
(SD)
Referential-Type
Self-referential
.760 (.38)
Other-referential
.541 (.31)
Non-directed
.365 (.22)
Post-Type
Humor
Capitalizing
Community Identification
Information / Mobilization
Visually Appealing
Social Support

.562 (.39)
.692 (.35)
.446 (.18)
.556 (.20)
.255 (.20)
1.10

Note: The post type subcategory “social support” has a frequency of one and, thus, no standard
deviation. For each referential type subcategory, n= 14.

Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the findings from this study lend support to the applicability of
SIDE in anonymous online contexts and add to the scarce body of knowledge
regarding how deindividuation operates on Imgur.com. Self-referential posts were
found to have a significantly higher number of downvotes per 1,000 views than
non-directed posts, with the difference approaching statistical significance when
compared to other-referential content, lending support to the research expectation
and suggesting that Imgurians perceive individuating information more negatively
within the anonymous online context of the site. Notably, posts categorized as
“visually appealing” and “community identification,” which were most commonly
of a non-directed and other-referential nature, respectively, had the lowest rate of
downvotes among the post-type subcategories. Conversely, posts categorized as
“capitalizing” and “social support,” which were most often of a self-referential
nature, received the most downvotes per 1,000 views. The difference in the mean
number of downvotes per 1,000 views across the post-type subcategories, however,
may simply be due to the higher number of self-referential, other-referential, and
non-directed posts falling under each post-type rather than any practically
important interaction effect, as evidenced by the nonsignificant results from the
two-way ANOVA conducted in the analysis.
In conclusion, the findings from this study suggest that deindividuation is
facilitated on Imgur and, due to the salience of a social identity which is valued and
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upheld on the site, self-referential content that highlights individuating information
is more likely to be sanctioned by community members than other-referential and
non-directed posts. These findings not only support past studies of the platform
(Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014), but further elucidate the communicative and
behavioral mechanisms that reinforce in-group status, group standards, and
collective identity in anonymous online contexts. The current study, however, is
not without its limitations. First, the considerably small sample of posts may have
led to nonsignificant findings that would have reached statistical significance given
an adequate sample size. For this reason, the findings from this study should not be
considered generalizable to the entire platform and future studies should strive for
substantially larger samples. Second, selection of posts from Imgur’s “front page”
may pose issues of sampling bias in favor of well-received posts. Although the
current study addresses this issue by comparing posts based on downvotes per 1,000
views (i.e., relative negative assessment), future studies should seek to sample from
the “user-submitted” and “rising” galleries to ascertain whether differences in
reception exist at various stages of the “virality” process. Finally, while mutual
exclusivity is a necessary condition of quantitative content analyses, the current
research design did not permit cross-coding into multiple subcategories, a
constraint which may detract from the nuance and complexity of content posted to
Imgur.com and, thereby, the exhaustiveness of the coding scheme. For this reason,
future studies should carefully weigh the relative benefits of mutual exclusivity and
exhaustiveness when constructing or adapting the categories into which content is
coded.
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An Application of Risk Analysis
to the Doctrine of Self-Defense
Kirsten Welch
Abstract
Although it is an unavoidable aspect of any self-defense situation, risk is an
underdeveloped concept in the self-defense literature. In this paper, I argue that the
existence of objective risk can justify the use of self-defense, even in cases in which
defensive action is not clearly necessary. To accomplish this, I first introduce the
concept of risk, seeking a definition that incorporates both objective and subjective
elements in a manner appropriate to a discussion of self-defense. In section two, I
make a case for the appropriate way to carry out and apply risk analysis in selfdefense situations, addressing questions of perspective, types of threats, and
availability of alternatives to the use of defense of force. Based on this discussion,
I will suggest that it is unjust to require a person to take on extra risk when that risk
can be transferred to the person responsible for the creation of the risk. In section
three, I discuss some significant implications the consideration of risk as suggested
by my analysis has for current approaches to self-defense doctrine. Most
importantly, my analysis indicates that self-defense can be justified even if using
violent force against an aggressor is not strictly necessary.
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Consider the following two scenarios:
Case 1: Dr. Maleficus, an evil scientist, has forced Bill into a game of Russian
roulette. Dr. Maleficus, being the brilliant scientist that he is, has created a gun
that is bigger on the inside and has a thousand chambers, only one of which actually
contains a bullet. Dr. Maleficus is about to pull the trigger. May Bill kill him in
self-defense?1
Case 2: Westley has been captured by the Dread Pirate Roberts, who has the
reputation of killing all his hostages without mercy. The Dread Pirate Roberts,
however, being in an amiable frame of mind, has decided to let Westley live one
more night. Before retiring, he says, “Good night, Westley. Sleep tight. I’ll most
likely kill you in the morning.” During the night, Westley discovers that his door
is unlocked and that the Dread Pirate Roberts carelessly left his sword lying on the
deck. May Westley kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense?2
Does Bill or Westley have a higher chance of dying if he does not choose to act in
self-defense? We do not have an exact numerical probability by which to estimate the
chances that the Dread Pirate Roberts will kill Westley in the morning, but it is probably
safe to assume that the probability is higher—indeed, significantly higher—than the one in
one thousand chance of dying that Bill faces. Arguably, then, if Bill should be able to act
in self-defense in Case 1, Westley should be able to act in self-defense in Case 2, given his
chance of dying is much greater than Bill’s. The problem, though, is that current selfdefense doctrine as employed in many jurisdictions demands a different evaluation:
according to the rule of self-defense, Bill may kill Dr. Maleficus, but Westley may not kill
the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense.
In this paper, I will make the case for the claim that Westley should be able to
employ self-defense against the Dread Pirate Roberts. In doing so, I will focus my
discussion on a concept that has so far been underdeveloped in the self-defense literature:
the concept of risk. I will argue that the existence of objective risk can justify the use of
self-defense, even in cases in which the possibility of death or serious injury is not
imminent and situations in which defensive action is not clearly necessary. To accomplish
1

Russian roulette cases crop up frequently in the self-defense literature. For an example of how a
Russian roulette case can contribute to constructing a theory of self-defense, see Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” Law and Philosophy 24 (2005): 711-749.
2
This case, in its essential features, is a slightly more theatrical version of Paul Robinson’s hostage
scenario. See Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 2 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1984): 77.
Note that one way to accommodate the intuition that the hostage character should be able to act in
self-defense in these sorts of cases is to claim that self-defense is being employed not directly against
the threat of future death but rather against the ongoing harm resulting from loss of freedom and
violation of rights. For this sort of response, see Onder Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to
Self-Defense: Is the Requirement of Imminence Merely a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?”
Journal of Criminal Law 72 (2008): 161. Whether or not Bakircioglu is correct in his analysis, for
the purposes of this paper I believe we can safely disregard this objection, as some real-life cases I
will examine later on will make it clear this sort of analysis does not always solve the problem.
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this, I will first introduce the concept of risk, highlighting the epistemic difficulties inherent
in self-defense situations. In section two, I will make a case for the appropriate way to
carry out and apply risk analysis in self-defense situations, suggesting a person should not
be required to take on extra unjust risk when that risk can be transferred to the person
culpable for the creation of the risk. In section three, I will discuss some significant
implications the consideration of risk as suggested by my analysis has for current
approaches to self-defense doctrine.
1. What is Risk?
Risk is most simply understood as a probability of harm.3 When we engage in
risky behavior, we understand we are creating the chance that a certain negative outcome
will materialize as a result of our conduct.4 Thus, in order to understand risk, we need to
grasp its two main constituent concepts: probability and harm.5 For the purposes of this
project, we can treat harm as a fairly straightforward idea: anything that serves to provide
a setback to a person’s interests can count as a harm.6 Probability is quite a bit more
complicated. We need to distinguish between two different types of probability, and hence
two different approaches to the notion of risk.
Probability can be objective or epistemic. A common way of describing objective
probability is the use of relative frequencies. On this view, the probability that an event
will occur is determined by the rate at which the event occurs in similar situations.7 This
frequency is simply an objective fact about the world, independent of whether anybody can
come to know that fact. On the other hand, epistemic conceptions of probability appeal to
at least some degree of subjectivity when making probability assessments. Epistemic
conceptions of probability fall on an objective/subjective spectrum, and the view of
epistemic probability with which we will be concerned for this project combines objective
and subjective elements. This view is what Stephen Perry calls the “reasonableness
account” of epistemic probability, and he claims this account is grounded in two
fundamental assumptions: first, relative frequencies as hypothesized by the purely
John Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,” Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 369.
Stephen R. Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law,
ed. David Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 322.
5
Id.
6
This definition comes from Stephen Perry, id. Interestingly, on this definition, it seems that risk
itself could be a harm, as being forced to live with risk could be a setback to a person’s interests on
many levels. Some scholars have made arguments that risk itself is a harm along these lines: for
an argument based on the negative value of risk, see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” in
The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016): 134-135; for an argument grounded in the concept of autonomy, see Oberdiek,
“Towards a Right Against Risking,” 367-392; for an argument centered on the claim that risk makes
a person worse-off than he would have been otherwise, see Claire Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (2003): 963-1001. If risk itself is a harm, this assertion
might further support the claim that the existence of risk can legitimize the use of self-defense. This
is a controversial stance, however, and so I will not make use of it in my own argument.
7
Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” 323.
3
4
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objective account really do exist; second, people are capable of estimating those
frequencies.8 Thus, the reasonableness account of epistemic probability incorporates the
objectivity of relative frequencies and a subjective assessment supported by those relative
frequencies.
When applying these two conceptions of probability to the concept of risk, it
becomes clear that we can approach our analysis of risk in two different ways. If we make
use of the purely objective account of probability, then risk is a relative frequency
calculated by the function of the number of times the risk is manifested in actual harm
divided by the total number of relevantly similar situations. An epistemic conception of
probability, on the other hand, will yield a conception of risk in which risk is a subjective
estimation of the chance the harm threatened by the risk will come to fruition. Using a
purely subjective epistemic account, risk is nothing more than what the person at risk
believes it to be, but the reasonableness account of epistemic risk leads to a subjective but
evidence-driven estimation of the relative frequencies posited by the objective view.
For the purposes of this project, we will be concerned with the reasonableness
account of epistemic risk. Both the purely subjective epistemic version and the purely
objective version include pitfalls that significantly undermine the concerns of the selfdefense doctrine under consideration. When working with a purely subjective conception
of risk, the chance the harm will materialize is divorced from reality. On the other hand, it
seems questionable that we could ever achieve a useful assessment of risk that is purely
objective—indeed, the very process of a person assessing the probability that a harm will
materialize necessitates the inclusion of a subjective element.9
2. Assessing Risk for Self-Defense
Now that we have a grasp of the main features of risk, we can apply this concept
to the theory of self-defense. An essential feature of self-defense situations is that, given
our epistemic limitations, these situations always involve a certain degree of uncertainty,
some more so than others.10 We can never be sure whether self-defense is truly necessary
or not.11 As a result, every case of self-defense demands an evaluation of risk. Given this,
8

Id. at 325.
Claire Finkelstein argues we do not ever have access to truly objective probabilities: “[T]here is
no such thing as an objective probability. There are only degrees of belief or confidence about the
likelihood of a certain event occurring … Thus although an agent’s degree of belief will be based
on real observations he can make, likelihoods cannot be a matter of objective facts.” Finkelstein,
“Is Risk a Harm?” 973. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan support a similar view.
claiming that “objective probabilities are illusory.” See Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and
Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 31.
10
As Larry Alexander observes with respect to self-defense, “Only God can see the future with
absolute certainty.” Larry Alexander, “A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection.” Notre
Dame Law Review 74 (1999): 1478. Because we cannot see the future, self-defense is always
preemptive, and as a result, uncertainty will always be present to some degree. See Bergelson,
“Self-Defense and Risks,” 132.
11
This surety goes for the defender at the moment of self-defense as well as for the court after selfdefense has taken place. In fact, the only situations in which it seems we can be sure that self9
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it might seem surprising that risk has received relatively little attention within the context
of self-defense.12
In section one, I explained the conception of risk this project will be utilizing. This
explanation gives us a structure with which to proceed, but it does not tell us how we ought
to go about assessing the level of risk present in a scenario on a practical level or how that
risk should be employed when thinking about situations of self-defense.13 From what
perspective should we assess risk? What sort of threats should we take into account when
estimating the level of risk? To what degree should we take into consideration alternatives
that might allow the potential victim to dispel the risk? I will address each of these three
questions in turn.
2.1 Perspective
I endorsed the “reasonableness” account of epistemic risk for two reasons: first,
because it maintains a tie to objectivity in that it attempts to estimate accurately the
important relative frequencies; second, because it recognizes the fact that whenever a
person carries out a risk evaluation, that evaluation will be conducted from a certain
perspective. The question at hand, then, is what perspective is the appropriate one to
consider in self-defense scenarios. I want to evaluate three possible answers to this
question, rejecting two and tentatively accepting the other. I will not consider the
perspective of the aggressor, because considering this perspective ceases to assign meaning
to the concept of risk in the first place: since the aggressor is in control of the situation,
from his perspective the risk to the victim will essentially be either 100% or 0%, depending
on whether or not he truly intends to kill.14
First, consider the perspective of the defender. In most situations, it seems that the
defender will form a belief that he is at risk based on the presence of certain behaviors or
threats manifested on the part of the aggressor. In other words, the defender’s belief that
he is at risk will not come out of thin air. But is this belief enough? Even if the defender
forms his belief based on evidence that he is at risk, it seems that in many situations, such
a belief will also be influenced—in fact, perhaps influenced even more greatly—by
subjective factors such as fear or hate.15 Human beings are emotional creatures, and as

defense was necessary are situations in which the potential defender chose not to use self-defense
and was afterwards killed by the aggressor.
12
Bergelson observes that “the current law of self-defense seems to ignore the degree of risk that
the target of an offense may be actually hurt.” Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 141.
13
Ferzan addresses this question, concluding the perspective of the defender is the only appropriate
starting point from which to assess the risk present in a self-defense situation. See Ferzan,
“Justifying Self-Defense,” 739-748.
14
I suppose it could be argued that the aggressor cannot know if he is about to suffer a fatal heart
attack in the five seconds before he intends to pull the trigger, but I think that we can safely ignore
this sort of objection here.
15
People who have been under a great deal of stress or have dealt with abuse for a significant amount
of time might be especially likely to estimate risk based on their subjective fears rather than objective
evidence. For a discussion of how chronic pressure can affect people’s judgment, see Richard
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such, we are radically subject to distorted perceptions of reality. A potential defender will
probably be able to discern that he is facing some sort of threat, but he might not be able
to evaluate accurately the nature and degree of the riskiness in his situation. For this reason,
I believe that making the defender’s perspective the only one we take into consideration
when evaluating risk is implausible.16
Next, consider the perspective of a “reasonable” defender. The “reasonable
person” standard is incredibly muddled, and it seems no one really knows what it is
supposed to mean.17 For this project, though, consider the following scenario and the
meaning of ‘reasonable’ it entails:
Vulcan Bob has been incarcerated in a human prison for obnoxious theorizing. As
is typical of a Vulcan, Vulcan Bob is extremely rational: his emotions do not lead
him astray in his decision-making processes, and he is capable of accurately
evaluating the probable outcomes of many situations. Unfortunately, Vulcan Bob
has been placed in a cell with another prisoner, Evil Joe, who has a reputation for
sexually abusing his cellmates – especially those with strangely shaped ears.
Within the first day in the cell, Evil Joe begins to threaten to rape Vulcan Bob in
the middle of the night. Vulcan Bob evaluates the risk he faces and calculates that
there is (roughly) a 90% chance that Evil Joe will actually attempt to rape him
within the next week.
In this scenario, Vulcan Bob is still assessing the risk from a subjective perspective; that
is, he is assessing it based on the access he has to the evidence that he is indeed at risk.
However, Vulcan Bob is assessing risk purely based on the objective data about this
particular situation.18
The sort of risk assessment in which Vulcan Bob engages would probably be an
excellent standard by which to evaluate risk. It is objective in that it is concerned with the
available evidence, and it is subjective in that it is still conducted from a limited epistemic
Lippke, “Chronic Temptation, Reasonable Firmness, and the Criminal Law,” Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 34, no. 1 (2014): 75-96.
16
Ferzan accepts the perspective of the defender as the proper perspective for assessing risk.
However, she does so only after establishing that what she calls “objective triggering conditions”
exist in the particular situation. On her view, once objective triggering conditions have been
established, any possibility of risk is enough to merit self-defense on the part of the potential victim;
as a result, it does not significantly matter whether or not the victim’s perceptions are being distorted
by emotional factors. My project is slightly different, in that I want to determine the correct
perspective from which to decide whether the triggering conditions in fact create risk. For Ferzan’s
discussion of triggering conditions, see Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 733-738.
17
For a brief overview of some of the approaches to the “reasonable person” and a discussion of the
problems associated with the vagueness of the standard, see Andrew Ingram, “Parsing the
Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense,” American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (2012):
430-433.
18
For an argument in support of this sort of approach, see Michael J. Zimmerman, Living with
Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008): ix-xi, 97-117. Vera Bergelson rejects this approach for practical reasons similar to mine:
see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 137.
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perspective. I believe, however, that this approach to risk assessment is also implausible,
mainly because it is, arguably, impossible. No one, whether the defender or a third party,
will be able to assess truly impartially the risk associated with an isolated situation.
Vulcans, in real life, do not exist.
Finally, I want to consider the third-party perspective. Vera Bergelson argues for
the use of what she calls a “contemporaneous objective standard” when evaluating the
degree of risk present in a situation.19 The key question for this approach is this: “What is
the likelihood that, in the ordinary course of things, this risk will materialize?”20 This
approach combines both objective and subjective elements in a way that seems to fit well
with the purpose of the self-defense doctrine. On the one hand, it accounts for the limited
epistemic perspective of the person assessing the risk, as such a person must try to answer
the key question based on whatever evidence he has about the situation, and similar
situations, at that time. It also recognizes the difficulty of precisely assessing the degree
of risk when human agents are involved.21 On the other hand, it makes use of the concept
of relative frequency by use of the notion of “the ordinary course of things.”22 Despite our
limited epistemic perspective, we can still access statistical information that will help us
estimate the likelihood that a risk will come to fruition.23
There is an objection to this approach that is worth considering. The
contemporaneous objective standard demands that we compare the current situation with
other similar scenarios. The problematic question is as follows: what counts as the set of
similar scenarios? This question is a generality problem, a problem of reference class. It
seems we could infinitely redraw the relevant reference class by specifying different levels
Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risk,” 137.
Id. Note also that either the defender or the trier of fact could ask this question, but doing so
would involve a detached, third party perspective in either case.
21
This is the case even in instances of Russian roulette, when we can calculate some portion of the
probability with complete precision. If we know how many chambers the gun has and how many
bullets are in the chambers, then we can calculate the exact probability that the victim will be killed
if the gun is fired. But it does not tell us anything about the probability that the gun will, in fact, be
fired: “To be clear, this approach does not allow for the precise calculation, mainly because of the
difficulty in predicting the choice of a free moral agent, particularly the choice to act wrongfully;
however, it gives us at least a general sense of high and low probability and it does so from the
objective perspective required by the justificatory nature of self-defense.” Id. at 137-138.
22
The phrase, “in the ordinary course of things,” is, admittedly, a bit vague. A comment in Roy v.
U.S. clarifies what Bergelson means by this phrase in the context of the contemporaneous objective
standard: “The phrase “in the ordinary course of things” refers to what may reasonably ensue from
the planned events, not to what might conceivably happen, and in particular suggests the absence of
intervening factors.” Roy v. U.S., 652 A. 2d 1098, 1105 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
23
Christopher Schroeder suggests that statistical evaluation, when applied to a large enough sample,
can give us an excellent estimate of the chance that risky behavior will result in harm: “Once the
probability of harm associated with a risky action can be gauged, an axiom of statistical theory holds
that a sufficient number of repetitions of that action practically guarantees that the harm actually
will occur.” See Christopher Schroeder, “Rights against Risks,” Columbia Law Review 86 (1986):
500. Given the difficulty of predicting the behavior of human agents, this claim might be overly
optimistic, but it seems that statistical information certainty can help us make accurate estimations
of risk.
19
20
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of generality for the similarity requirement. 24 To illustrate this problem, at this point it
will be helpful to introduce a few real-life cases that will continue to form a basis for this
discussion. These cases are all concerned with threats of death or serious bodily harm in
prison contexts.25
State v. Schroeder: Schroeder shared a cell with Riggs, who had a reputation for
violence and forcing sex upon fellow inmates. For a while, Riggs had been
coercing Schroeder into gambling with him, and, as a result, Schroeder owed Riggs
a large debt, which Riggs had been threatening to collect in the form of homosexual
favors. On the night in question, before going to sleep, Riggs said that he might
“collect some of this money I got owed me tonight.” While Riggs was asleep,
Schroeder stabbed him in the back with a table knife.26
U.S. v. Haynes: Haynes, an inmate at a federal prison, was convicted of assault
after he poured scalding oil on the head of a fellow inmate, Nelson Flores-Pedroso,
while Flores-Pedroso was sitting in the prison cafeteria. Flores-Pedroso had a
reputation for coercing weaker inmates, and for about a month prior to this assault,
Flores-Pedroso had been threatening Haynes with forced homosexual acts if
Haynes did not use his position as a member of the food preparation staff in the
kitchen to do favors for Flores-Pedroso.27
U.S. v. Bello: Bello, an inmate who was working in the food line at the prison
cafeteria, denied second helpings to the victim Santana-Rosa as not all the
prisoners had been served yet. Santana told Bello that he was going to “crack open
[Bello’s] head,” and after the meal was over another inmate came up and told Bello
24

John Oberdiek observes that if we can infinitely redraw the reference class and have no guidelines
as to how to specify the correct reference class, an objective account of probability becomes every
bit as indeterminate as a subjective account. See Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,”
368.
25
It is worth noting that the question of whether prison inmates should be able to plead self-defense
at all has been answered in different ways. A negative answer to the question might be motivated
by the intuition that, as prison inmates are responsible for ending up in prison in the first place, they
are indirectly responsible for the threat that motivates acting in self-defense. As a result, they should
not be able to plead self-defense at all. For example, in Rowe v. Debruyn, Rowe was denied selfdefense as a complete defense by prison officials at a disciplinary hearing after having been involved
in a brawl with another inmate, Michael Evans. Evans, who occupied the cell next to Rowe, made
sexual demands upon Rowe, and the morning after making these demands, Evans entered Rowe’s
cell and attempted to rape him. Rowe responded by striking Evans on the head with a pot. The
circuit court held that the prison officials did not violate Rowe’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by not allowing him to plead self-defense as a complete defense. See Rowe
v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994). For an argument in support of the right of prison inmates
to employ self-defense in general, see Anders Kaye, “Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense
in Prison and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence,” University of Chicago Law Review 63, no. 2 (1996):
693-726.
26
State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822 (1978).
27
U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 1998).
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that Santana planned to assault him in the recreational yard later on. Later, during
the recreational period, Bello attacked Santana, who was playing dominoes, with
a broom handle and gave him a serious concussion.28
These cases have many similarities: all involve verbal threats, all involve a fellow inmate
with whom the potential victim had some prior contact, etc. But significant differences
exist as well. Schroeder and Riggs were cellmates. In Bello, the threat was reiterated
through another individual, which was not the case in Schroeder or Haynes. Schroeder
and Haynes both faced repeated threats, whereas Bello’s situation seemed to be a one-time
occurrence. So, what should the criteria be for determining the relevant reference classes
for these situations?
One approach might be to make the reference class as narrow and specific as
possible, thereby restricting the question of what might happen in the ordinary course of
things to cases with essentially all the same features. This approach, however, seems to be
unhelpful in that it simply does not give us enough comparative information, as the
variation between cases will be great enough to restrict the reference class to an extent that
will make it useless. In fact, if the reference class were restricted far enough, the
meaningfulness of the objective contemporaneous standard would dissipate. Rather than
focusing on the minute details of the case, I suggest that the appropriate way to establish
the reference class is with broader criteria, using essential features as the means by which
to include similar cases. So, in the above three cases, it might be appropriate to separate
Schroeder and Haynes from Bello, as in the former two cases, the defendant faced repeated
threats that were backed by the reputation of the aggressor. It is unrealistic to assume that
we can establish indubitably clear lines for reference classes, but I believe that we are
capable of distinguishing enough relevant similarities between cases to render the concept
a useful tool.
2.2 Types of Threat
We have established that an objective contemporaneous standard for assessing risk
is the best one we have at our disposal. Next, we must determine what the appropriate
inputs are for this method of assessment. In other words, what sort of things should we
consider when determining whether relevant risk exists in a self-defense situation?
Some of the most important indicators of risk, at least for situations of self-defense,
are threats. A threat is something that indicates the possible existence of future harm.29
28

U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1999).
Within the context of war and international self-defense, Dapo Akande and Thomas Lieflander
define a threat in the following way: “A threat is a situation where a causal chain can lead from the
status quo (no attack) to an undesired future (attack).” See Akande and Lieflander, “Necessity,
Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense,” American Journal of International
Law 107, no. 3 (2013): 564. At least in the context of domestic self-defense, it might be more
appropriate to think of a threat as an indication of a situation that could lead to the realization of
harm. Ferzan provides a definition to this effect: “[T]hreats are actions that appear to present a risk
of harm.” Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 736. When an aggressor holds a gun to a victim’s
head, that situation itself does not cause the future harm; rather, the situation indicates that the future
29
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Given this definition, threats are closely tied to risk assessments, as threats are the means
by which a potential defender can evaluate the degree of risk he faces. Generally, however,
the only sorts of threat that have consistently been given weight in self-defense cases are
ones that involve immediate physical violence. Examples of such threats might be an
aggressor putting a loaded gun to a victim’s head or an aggressor advancing upon a victim
with an arm poised to strike.
One type of threat (interestingly, the type of which we often think when using the
word “threat” in everyday language) has been almost entirely excluded from self-defense:
verbal threats.30 This restriction is understandable: we do not want to broaden the type of
threat considered legitimate to the extent that a joking or impulsive utterance of, “I’m going
to kill you!” should justify someone in employing self-defense. Mere utterances, most of
the time, will not be enough to make a potential aggressor liable to defensive harm.31 In
light of the discussion of risk in which we have been engaged, though, I suggest that it is
appropriate to push back against this restriction as it stands. In doing so, we need to
distinguish between two different types of situations: ones in which a verbal threat is the
only indication of the existence of risk, and ones in which the risk evidenced by a verbal
threat is confirmed by other information.
Consider the cases of Schroeder and Bello. Recall that, in Bello, the facts of the
case report that the reason Bello thought he was in danger was because Smith had verbally
threatened him. In Schroeder, the defendant also faced verbal threats from an aggressor,
Riggs, but this threat was not the only reason Schroeder considered himself to be at
significant risk. Rather, Schroeder had both the evidence of the verbal threats and of the
fact that Riggs had a reputation of abusing fellow inmates the way he was threatening to
abuse Schroeder. Thus, in Schroeder’s case, Riggs’s utterances were confirmed by
excellent evidence that Riggs was not simply making idle verbal threats; in fact, even
without the direct verbal threat, it does not seem completely unreasonable for Schroeder to
have considered himself in danger. So, for Schroeder, verbal threats confirmed what
already would have been likely when evaluated under the contemporaneous objective
standard: similar situations involving the very same aggressor indicated that Schroeder
truly was in danger.
An objection to this approach is that it seems unfair to the aggressor: should a
person really be liable to defensive harm even without engaging directly in physically
harm is likely by conveying the intentions of the aggressor and providing the means by which the
aggressor can act on those intentions.
30
For a court decision reflecting this view, see People v. Lucas: “[T]hreats alone, unaccompanied
by some act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted,
do not justify a homicide.” People v. Lucas, 160 Ca. App. 2d 305, 310 (1958). It is safe to assume
that the wording of the opinion in this case meant “verbal threats” when referring to “threats.”
31
Liability is a complicated topic that has attracted tremendous scholarly attention in recent years.
Two primary accounts of liability frame the debate: internalism, on which a person is liable to
defensive harm only if such harm is necessary; and externalism, on which a person can be liable to
defensive harm even if such harm is not necessary. I believe that externalism is a better approach.
For a defense of a version of externalism, see Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014): 88-120. Rather than focusing on the internalism/externalism debate,
though, my question deals with what sorts of things can make someone liable to defensive harm.
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abusive action? I suggest that the right answer to this question is “yes.” At least in the
sorts of situations we are discussing, it seems undeniable that most aggressors are aware
that their verbal threats will place their victims in a difficult situation; in fact, this is
probably exactly why they choose to make the verbal threats. So, liability is still being
assigned based on the choice of the aggressor to initiate a game of risk.32 If anything, it
seems unjust to the potential victim to force him to assume that the aggressor might not
have meant what he said.
This distinction between a threat that consists only of words and a verbal threat
that is confirmed by other evidence gives us a tool with which to allow consideration of
verbal threats while at the same time preserving reasonable restrictions on the type of threat
that legitimizes self-defense. The existence of verbal threats creates risk, and this risk is
often not negligible. Considering some verbal threats in addition to physical threats allows
us to treat risk assessment with a greater level of seriousness and concern.
2.3 Availability of Alternatives
Another concern that often arises in self-defense situations is whether the defender
had other alternatives to employ besides violent self-defense. If a person can choose a
course of action that can dispel the risk he faces and does not involve harming somebody
else, that person should act in the non-harmful manner, even if the person against whom
he is defending himself is fully culpable and liable to defensive harm.33 One of the ways
this idea has been most clearly articulated is in the duty to retreat that is often demanded
of potential self-defenders.34 I agree that, if safe retreat is an option, that option should be
the most preferable one for the potential defender to use; however, in some situations
retreat is not an option, and one of the reasons I have been considering prison violence
cases is for that very reason. So, the question becomes whether a person must seek
alternative methods of averting the threat and dispelling the risk even when retreat is not
an option.
32

Ferzan emphasizes the importance of the choice of the aggressor when defining what she thinks
are appropriate “triggering conditions” for the use of self-defense: “Now, it is true that we are
allowing preemptive action based on prediction, but we are also allowing preemptive action based
on the aggressor’s prior choice. The aggressor controls whether she will decide to injure another
person and she controls whether she will act on that intention. At that point, the game is on. It is a
game of risk, and a game of prediction. But the person who culpably initiates the situation can
hardly be heard to complain that the other actor takes her at her word.” Ferzan, “Justifying SelfDefense,” 731.
33
There are ways to affirm the wrongness of inflicting harm on an aggressor even if that aggressor
is culpable and liable. See Frowe, Defensive Killing, 89.
34
The duty to retreat entails that if a person has a way to retreat from the violent situation in safety,
he has an obligation to do so rather than use self-defense. The Model Penal Code reflects this
requirement, stating that an actor may not justifiably use deadly force if he “knows that he can avoid
the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.” MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
The duty to retreat has been questioned on several different levels: exceptions include the so-called
“castle doctrine” and “stand your ground” legislation. For a recent argument in defense of the “stand
your ground” approach, see Heidi Hurd, “Stand Your Ground,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed.
Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 254-273.
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In the prison violence cases under discussion, all three of the defendants were
convicted. Two of them were condemned on the grounds that they did not seek assistance
in their respective situations.35 Theoretically, there was an alternative way for each of them
to dispel the risk they faced rather than preemptively taking action and attacking their
aggressors: each could have sought help, reported the abuse, or simply waited things out.36
Theoretically, there was an alternative, but consideration of the reality brings risk into play
again. In many situations involving prison violence, inmates are reluctant to report abuse
for several reasons, including fear of retaliation from the aggressor, being labeled a “snitch”
by fellow inmates, which would very likely lead to a higher level of abuse, or the belief
(and very likely a justified one) that no help would be given even if requested.37 Thus,
even though these are alternatives to self-defense, they are not alternatives that
unquestionably serve to avert the threat or dispel the risk—in fact, it is arguable that
reporting abuse could actually increase the level of risk a person faces. We do not demand
fulfillment of the duty to retreat unless the person can do so in safety. Why, then, do we
always require the pursuit of alternatives to self-defense when doing so sometimes carries
with it a risk of decreasing rather than increasing safety?
I suggest that requiring a person to take on additional risk as an alternative to
employing self-defense is unjust. The person who should bear additional risk in a violent
situation is not the victim of the situation, but rather the person who culpably creates the
situation.38 When possible, risk should be transferred to the person responsible for the
creation of that risk. If safe alternatives exist, the potential defender should pursue those
alternatives, but if those alternatives themselves are risky, he should not be required to do
so.

In Bello, the opinion stated, “Bello could have reported the incident to the guards and requested
the protection they were required to provide.” See U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1999).
This reasoning was based off of the court’s decision in U.S. v. Haynes, in which the opinion claimed
that “absence of lawful alternatives is an element of all lesser-evil defenses, of which self-defense
is one.” See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998). Interestingly, though, in the case
of U.S. v. Biggs, the circuit court ruled as follows, in opposition to the decisions in Bello and Haynes:
“Evidence that a defendant had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the use of force is relevant only
to a defense of justification, whether labeled duress, coercion or necessity, and is not an element of
a claim of self-defense.” See U.S. v. Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). This opinion
demonstrates that there is some hesitancy regarding the requirement that all available alternative
must be exhausted before self-defense becomes a legitimate option.
36
Some scholars suggest that the “wait and see” course of action is the appropriate one, because
something might change that would render the use of self-defensive force superfluous. See
Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to Self-Defense,” 161. I think this approach places an
unjust burden on the potential victim.
37
For example, in Haynes, the aggressor had slammed the defendant down to the floor in front of a
prison guard, and the guard had ignored the violence. See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th
Cir. 1998). In Schroeder, the defendant had requested that Riggs be moved to a different cell several
days before, but no action was taken. See State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822, 824 (1978).
38
Richard Rosen also argues for this claim in “On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers,” North Carolina Law Review 71, no. 2 (1993): 390-411.
35
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3. Implications for Self-Defense Doctrine
Throughout this paper, I have tried to avoid appealing to discussions about two of
the central elements of the traditional (and still widely accepted) doctrine of self-defense:
imminence and necessity.39 I deliberately avoided invoking these two features of the selfdefense doctrine, as doing so would have brought the argument to an abrupt halt. Starting
with imminence and necessity severely limits the range of discussion possible. Yet, the
latter two issues considered above—types of threats and availability of alternatives—are
grounded in concerns about these two main features of most self-defense doctrines.40 Now
that I have established methods for thinking about types of threats and availability of
alternatives in light of risk assessments, we are in a position to confront the requirements
of imminence and necessity, examining what the implications for these two features of selfdefense might be given the conclusions reached above.
First, consider imminence. When we take risk assessments into account, it is clear
that substantial risk can exist even when the danger to the potential victim is not imminent.
Why, then, should we refuse to include these assessments of risk in our evaluation of the
legitimacy of self-defense? Defenders of imminence might answer that the imminence
requirement serves two purposes with respect to risk: to help provide a truly accurate
assessment of risk, and to help ensure that the level of risk is high enough to merit selfdefensive action. 41 I will consider the former response first. True, in most situations, it
will be easier to assess risk with confidence that our assessment is accurate when
imminence is present; after all, the shorter the time frame between the birth of the threat
and the expected manifestation of that threat, the less we have to worry about factors that
might intervene during that time frame. I think this point would not be easy to dispute, and
I will not attempt to do so; however, this, in itself, provides little reason to reject other
valuable methods of risk assessment. The contemporaneous objective standard explored
above, in many situations, could yield an accurate assessment of risk even when the
threatened harm is in the future.
Turn next to the latter objection on the part of the imminence defender: imminence
helps ensure that a very high level of risk is present. The problem with this response is
As an example, here is Illinois’s statute: “A person is justified in the use of force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself
or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1
(West 2014).
40
The imminence requirement has been under fire in recent years. For example, see Rosen, “On
Self-Defense,” 371-411. Reflecting these concerns, some jurisdictions have done away with the
imminence requirement. For example, see Texas’s self-defense statute: “[A] person is justified in
using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful
force.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (West 2007).
41
Anthony Sebok suggests the belief that the level of risk cannot be high enough without physical
confrontation is what motivated the decision in Schroeder: “[Judges] ultimately do not believe the
probability of the infliction of a φ is ever as high in a nonconfrontational circumstance as it is in a
confrontation.” Anthony Sebok, “Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?”
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 57 (1996): 741.
39
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twofold. First, given our discussion of risk, it seems we can reasonably claim that a very
high level of risk is present in a situation even when imminence is absent. Second, this
objection seems to be assuming that only an extremely high level of risk—one approaching
a certainty of harm—is sufficient to merit self-defensive action. Imminence gives the
benefit of the doubt to the aggressor rather than the defender, thereby shifting the burden
of risk further into the defender’s court.42 But, given the above conclusion that the burden
of risk should be shifted to the person responsible for the creation of the risk, this approach
seems faulty. As a result, imminence is a questionable requirement to put on the use of
self-defense.
Many scholars have suggested that the real reason imminence is generally
considered to be important is because it shows us when self-defense is truly necessary.43
This point brings us to another foundational element of self-defense doctrine. The
necessity prong of traditional self-defense doctrine says that a person may act in selfdefense only when defensive action is necessary to avert the harm in question.44 Now, as
noted above, necessity is never absolute, because our limited epistemic position makes it
impossible for us ever to be completely sure that defensive force is the only way a threat
can be averted. Nevertheless, we strive to as close an approximation of necessity as
possible, and it continues to serve as the measuring stick by which we evaluate claims to
self-defense. 45 Despite recognition of the fact that necessity cannot, practically, be
absolute, I suggest self-defense doctrine has still failed to appreciate fully the difficulties
posed by our limited epistemic status at the expense of many potential victims in
threatening situations.
In most of the prison violence cases we have been considering, it would be a stretch
to say that the use of self-defensive force was truly necessary. The exception to this
statement might be Schroeder: since the defendant had already sought help, to no avail,
This reading is how Ferzan interprets the role of the imminence requirement: “Importantly, the
imminence requirement, or absence thereof, shifts the risk of harm between the aggressor and the
defender.” Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 719.
43
This is a very common view of the role of imminence in the self-defense doctrine; scholars often
refer to imminence as a “proxy” for necessity. See Richard Rosen, “On Self-Defense,” 380. Ferzan,
however, defends the imminence requirement with different reasoning, claiming that getting rid of
imminence leads to a failure to separate acts of self-defense from acts of mere self-preference and
that imminence is not merely a proxy for necessity but serves an independent purpose—to determine
when aggression is actually present. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Defending Imminence: From
Battered Women to Iraq.” Arizona Law Review 46 (2004): 213-262. Ferzan’s account of
aggression seems to indicate that only physical attack can function as aggression, but I think verbal
threats, at least when backed by known reputation, should count as aggressive action as well.
44
Or when a person “reasonably believes” the action is necessary. As we are trying to work within
an objective framework, I will simply deal with an objective necessity requirement here.
45
For example, Stephen Morse suggests using an extremely close approximation to necessity: “If
death or serious bodily harm in the relatively near future is a virtual certainty and the future attack
cannot be adequately defended against when it is imminent and if there really are no reasonable
alternatives, traditional self-defense doctrine ought to justify the pre-emptive strike.” See Stephen
Morse, “‘New Syndrome Excuse’ Syndrome,” Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1995): 12. I believe,
however, this level of “virtual certainty” is still unrealistic and is therefore unjust to the potential
victim.
42
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we might be comfortable with asserting that Schroeder had no other option open to him
and that the risk was high enough (in that it was a close enough approximation to necessity)
to legitimize self-defense when the necessity requirement is in place. In the other cases,
however, the defendants could have sought help, reported the threats, or simply waited
things out to see what would happen. But, as discussed above, requiring the defendants to
follow any of these other paths arguably would have exposed them to an even higher level
of risk than they already were facing. If we want to maintain that it is unjust to force a
person who is already a victim to take on additional risk in order to protect the person
responsible for imposing risk, then we must say that such persons should not be forced to
absorb any additional risk when doing so could be avoided. And, if the only way to avoid
absorbing additional risk is to transfer that risk to the aggressor, then we must say that the
victim should transfer the risk to the aggressor. And if the only way to transfer the risk to
the aggressor is to act in preemptive self-defense, then the victim should be able to act in
preemptive self-defense, even if such self-defense is not clearly necessary.
This train of reasoning makes it clear that my analysis of risk assessment carries
with it a major implication for self-defense doctrine: it seems there are some situations in
which a person should be able to act in self-defense even if we conclude self-defensive
action did not really seem necessary. In the prison violence cases described above, we
cannot be sure that self-defensive action was necessary, but our level of confidence is even
less when we consider whether the potential victim could have pursued an alternative
course of action without thereby incurring a greater level of risk. This undermining of
necessity is a serious consequence, and it might be that it is a cost too great to justify using
risk assessments in the way I have suggested. Addressing this difficulty, however, is
beyond the scope of this project, so I will consider it sufficient to point out the problem
and leave the weighing of the costs and benefits for another time. From this discussion,
however, it is clear that taking risk seriously in self-defensive situations has deep
consequences for self-defense doctrine as it is currently written and generally accepted.
4. Conclusion
Let us return to the pair of cases that motivated this exploration of the concept of
risk. Recall that in Case 1, Dr. Maleficus was playing Russian roulette with Bill, holding
a gun with one thousand chambers to Bill’s head. In Case 2, the Dread Pirate Roberts had
threatened to kill Westley in the morning, but during the night Westley had a chance to kill
the Dread Pirate Roberts first. Current self-defense doctrine would be able to absolve Bill
but not Westley, and I suggested this outcome seems wrong.
Given my argument regarding the proper application of risk analysis to cases of
self-defense, we now have the tools to make a case for the claim that Westley should also
be able to act in self-defense. Westley faces risk of death, and as judged by a
contemporaneous objective standard, that risk is significant. The threats of the Dread Pirate
Roberts have been given in verbal form, and as of yet, he has not physically threatened
Westley; however, those verbal threats contain a high level of credibility given the other
evidence Westley has about the merciless history of the pirate. Westley, arguably, has
some alternatives he could pursue rather than acting in self-defense: he could simply wait
things out, he could try to escape on a lifeboat, or he could hide someplace on the ship and
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hope he is not discovered before the ship reaches the next port. But, even if any of these
alternatives have a chance of success, they all require Westley to absorb additional risk.
Given these considerations, it seems that the level of risk Westley faces is sufficient to
merit him acting in self-defense, despite the facts that the threat he faces is not imminent
and that it is not clear that acting in self-defense is truly necessary. Thus, if Bill is justified
in killing Dr. Maleficus, despite the low level of risk Bill faces, Westley should be able to
kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense.
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The Christianization of Judith:
Considering the Hieronymian
Translation of Liber Iudith and
Jerome’s Christianizing Agenda
Brody Van Roekel
Abstract
I will consider Jerome’s translation using gendered analysis while considering
carefully how hints of his own preoccupations and Christianizing agendas can be
found within. In Liber Iudith, Jerome gives a night’s work to a text illustrating the
story of the Hebrew widow Judith single-handedly overcoming the seemingly
unassailable Assyrians. By comparing Jerome’s translation to the earlier Septuagint
text, a number of significant departures can be located. These departures
demonstrate Jerome’s conception of proper Christian widowhood, related too to his
qualms with femininity. The Hieronymian changes then appear to be both
culturally-motivated and implemented in response to the demands of an
increasingly Christian world.
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Notes on Methodology and Thesis
This project seeks to examine the Christianizing undertones of patristic
writers related to translations of the Vulgate Bible and the role of widows in the
Christian schema. Specifically, I will consider Jerome’s translation of the Book of
Judith using gendered analysis while considering carefully how hints of his own
preoccupations and Christianizing agendas can be found within. In Liber Iudith,
Jerome, working in the fourth- and fifth-centuries, illustrates the story of the
Hebrew widow Judith single-handedly overcoming the seemingly unassailable
Assyrians. The Septuagint, written in Greek and not Hebrew, may be the original
text for the Book of Judith. Alternatively, it may be a translation of a now-lost
Hebrew text. By comparing Jerome’s Latin translation to the earlier Septuagint
Greek text, a number of significant departures can be located. These departures
demonstrate Jerome’s conception of proper Christian widowhood, related too to his
qualms with femininity. The Hieronymian changes related to Jerome then appear
to be both culturally motivated and implemented in response to the demands of an
increasingly Christian world.1 The Hieronymian translation of Liber Iudith
demonstrates Jerome’s commitment to translating the Biblical text sensus e sensu.
While much of the “sense” of earlier texts is essentially present, the Christianization
of the Hebrew woman, Judith, is apparent in Jerome’s noticeable alterations.
Introduction: Hebraea illa
As the nearly ubiquitous Christianization of the Mediterranean world
proceeded between 100 CE and 500 CE, the early architects of the burgeoning
religion sought paradigmatic and often pre-existing figures to tie to their novel
worldviews. Renegotiated mores necessitated that the Church Fathers refashion
some of those figures in order that they be better suited to their values. Many of the
patristic writers, educated in pagan schools, had a fondness for classical literature,
as many were trained in classical works. Among other patristic authors, Augustine
spoke in his Confessions of the lasting impact classical literature had upon him.2
The appreciation led some of them to consider many classical authors as
progenitors to Christianity and to depict them as such. Moreover, patristic authors
needed to reconsider the Jewish texts with which Jesus was so familiar. The Church

K. F. B. Fletcher, “Hyginus’ Fabulae: Toward a Roman Mytholography,” in Writing Myth:
Mythography in the Ancient World, ed. S. Trzaskoma and R. Scott Smith (Leuven: Peeters, 2013),
135; although Fletcher applies this theoretical approach to the first-century BCE author Hyginus,
the framework can also be applied to Jerome’s translation of the Latin Vulgate.
2
Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. J.G. Pilkington, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol.
1, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1887), IV.7.
1
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Fathers’ religion was something novel, neither Greco-Roman nor Judaic, but a
combination of various extant frameworks from around the Mediterranean.
The legalization of Christianity by Constantine in the fourth century
precipitated an even greater push to formalize the institutions and orthodoxy of
Christianity, as the faith provided another opportunity to consolidate political
power. With that formalization, notions of gender hierarchy also crystalized.
Church Fathers generally co-opted classical structures of feminine submission.
However, certain aspects of Christianized conceptions of gender allowed for
possible expansions of female agency. Women could give up sexuality altogether,
entering a life of voluntary celibacy. The roles of women in specific situations were
also reconsidered. Widows, a commonplace reality given the youth of most wives
in the ancient world, constituted a unique position. Likely older upon their
husbands’ death, widows were left in a precarious position for a variety of reasons.
Already second-class citizens, widows had left their father’s protection. Widows
who did not have children were in an even more problematic situation. Without a
daughter to marry into the expanded protection of another man or a son to command
the household, widows were essentially alone in the world.
One such widow, the Jewess Judith, was alone except for her servants.3
Following her husband’s death, she remained single, but not for lack of suitors. Her
pious disposition earned her great respect from her community.4 The author of
Judith’s account also made her beauty exceedingly evident. The wealth left to her
by her husband allowed her to maintain a home filled with servants. 5 All of these
factors combine to both legitimize and make possible Judith’s salvation of her
homeland. Additionally, the original character of Judith appears to be soundly a
product of Jewish and Hellenistic perspectives.6 In his translation of Liber Iudith,
Jerome uses the virtuous qualities of the Jewish woman Judith, such as chastity,
elegance, and status, to his advantage.
In order to better depict her as an example of widowhood to Christian
women, Jerome departs in various instances from the earlier Septuagint text. He
insists that Judith’s chaste living is an important factor in her success, tying it
3

When referring to Latin phrases or sentences, I have employed the Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam
Versionem, edited by Robert Weber et. al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007). English
translations from the Vulgate have been rendered by myself, along with the MDVL 6000 class.
English translations from the Septuagint come from Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum
Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis editum VIII.4: Iudith (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1979). In order to easily differentiate between the Jerome’s Vulgate translation and
the Septuagint version of the same text, I will henceforth refer to both Jerome’s text and its
respective translations with “Iudith” and English translations from the Septuagint with “Ioudith.”
4
Iudith 8:8.
5
Iudith 8:7.
6
Judith, Deborah Levine Gera, Loren T. Stuckenbruk, and Hermann Lictenberger, ed. (Berlin:
DeGruyter, 2014).
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intimately with her piety. While Judith’s beauty remained an explicit detail, the
Hieronymian translation also asserted that her beauty was blessed by the Lord and
not intended for the pollution of seduction. Finally, Jerome portrays the memory of
Judith almost as if she were a canonized Christian sancta. The changes adopted by
Jerome demonstrate the conscious and subconscious, culturally motivated
reflections underlying his translations. New Christians of all contexts and situations
were looking for examples upon which to base their lives. For widows, then, the
Hieronymian Christianized Judith provided the perfect model.
Judith’s Chaste Widowhood and the Masculine Overpowering of
Womanhood
An especial focus on chastity constitutes the most significant addition in
Jerome’s rendering of Liber Iudith. Examining the growing prevalence of chastity
in the increasingly Christian world, it is unsurprising that Jerome puts such
significant effort into depicting Judith as such. While chastity was largely expected
for women in the ancient world, at least until marriage, social regulations on men’s
sex lives generally were more loosely guarded. Christianized late antique
perspectives slightly altered this reality. Sexual purity began to govern proper
masculine behavior along with proper feminine behavior. The imperative to
subjugate the body to the mind had roots in the classical school of thought,
Stoicism.7 Adapted by early Christians, chaste living mutated from an essentially
feminine virtue in the ancient world into one that was increasingly masculine.8 This
mutation is best shown in tying Christ, the perfect man, closely to chastity.
Ambrose, the fourth-century bishop of Milan, explains in De virginibus how
virginal chastity is both essentially freedom from sin and an imitation of the
immaculate Son of God.9
Both the command to live continently and the connection between
masculinity and chastity are found in Liber Iudith as Hieronymian additions.
Jerome’s Prologus offers a useful and unadulterated view into the translator’s
apparent agenda. As words penned by Jerome himself without the obligation of
Mathew Kuefler, “Desire and the Body in the Patristic Period,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Theology, Sexuality, and Gender, ed. Adrian Thatcher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
243.
8
Julia M. H. Smith, “The Problem of Female Sanctity in Carolingian Europe c. 780-920,” Past &
Present, no. 146 (1995): 18. Though this article considers a later context, looking to solidified
examples of femininity in Carolingian Europe can supplement our understanding of earlier
contexts.
9
Ambrosius Mediolanensis - De uirginibus (CPL 0145) - LLT-A, lib. : 1, cap. : 5, par. : 21, linea :
1: “Quid autem est castitas uirginalis nisi expers contagionis integritas? Atque eius auctorem quem
possumus aestimare nisi immaculatum dei filium, cuius caro non uidit corruptionem, diuinitas non
est experta contagionem? Videte igitur quanta uirginitatis merita sint.”
7
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translation, they provide essentially a single-remove from the patristic author.
Moreover, the Prologus contains two of the four instances of castitas, “chastity,”
in the Book of Judith. After expressing the initial disinterest he held towards the
account of Judith, Jerome implores readers to receive the story of the widow
Judith.10 He also commands readers to make the Hebrew widow known through
everlasting praise.11 For most readers, such praise may certainly be warranted. The
enthralling tale of a single woman overcoming insurmountable odds in order to save
her city grabs readers’ attention. Yet, Jerome interestingly does not explicitly
mention this main theme from Liber Iudith in his prologue.
Rather than depict her as a victorious hero of her people, Jerome opts to dub
Judith an exemplum castitatis or an example of chastity. Here, the translator alludes
to his inherent cultural motivation. Judith must be a paragon for the new chaste
ideal so integral to Jerome’s work. Indeed, Jerome himself also notes that she
provides an archetype to which both women and men need to aspire. 12 The
translator also suggests that her castitas should be ascribed exceedingly great
“virtue.”13 These examples demonstrate the importance of continence to Jerome
and chastity’s new masculinization. Judith is an obvious paradigm for women, but
the suggestion that she may also be imitated by men is striking. This fact is
especially prescient with Jerome’s inclusion of virtus, or “virtue,” and its use to
describe the Hebrew woman. Jerome and other architects of the early church utilize
the theme of femina virilis or virago for women whose ascetic prowess transcends
their gender.14 Patristic terminology tied masculinity to virtue. For women to be
virtuous, they needed to become masculine.15
While cenobitic monasticism was only beginning to crystalize in the fourth
century, Jerome had a ready example of female monasticism in Judith. Women
ascetics were often represented as adopting forms of domestic asceticism in which
they conducted their renunciations in their familial household.16 Judith’s ascetic
home life provides a good foundation upon which Jerome can expand her general
piety into specific sexual purity, a relatively short jump considering Jerome’s
cultural milieu. In addition to the instances of castitas in Jerome’s prologue, the
translator introduces the same phrase into his Latin rendering, while also tying the
virtue of chastity to masculinity outright. In the final chapter of Liber Iudith, the
Jerome, “Prologus” for Liber Iudith, in Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, ed. Robert
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11
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author describes how the hero Judith spends the remainder of her days in Bethulia.
Following the downfall of Holofernes and Israel’s salvation, the protagonist returns
to her home to renew her cloister-esque domesticity.
Yet, a few important differences can be seen between the texts. Though it
is implicit, Jerome introduces a subtle voice change in his translation. The
Septuagint text relates that “no man knew her in all the days of her life since the
day Manasses her husband had died.”17 This example assigns agency to the men
who wanted to know Judith. Jerome, however, reverses this agency and depicts
Judith as the active subject. He writes, “she was knowing no man for all days of her
life, from the day when Manasses died, her husband.”18 It is also important to note
that, had Jerome made cognosceret passive in voice, there would be no essential
difference. However, Judith is the subject of the active verb, and thus, the actor
herself.
Moreover, Jerome replaces entirely the sentiment preceding the line
examined above. The Septuagint notes that “many [men] desired” Judith.19
Jerome’s understanding of the sexual nature of this desire necessitated his need to
add to his translation. In lieu of men lusting after the Hebrew widow, Jerome adds
that Judith was included in the “virtue of chastity.”20 The Church Father connects
closely castitas with virtus. With the etymological connection between the Latin
word for “man,” vir, and virtus or “virtue,” one can then see the logical association
between manliness and chastity. Purity was now a moral imperative, and this
absolute divide between male and female likewise divided virtue and vice.21 The
divide and Judith’s uniqueness can be best seen in Jerome’s final inclusion of
castitas.
Immediately following the Bethulian victory over the Assyrians, the head
priest Joachim and all of his elders travel from Jerusalem in order to meet
Holofernes’ bane. The following quotations from the elders require special
attention. Instances of direct speech are useful as they are obviously chosen by the
author, putting words in the subject’s mouth. Upon meeting Judith, Joachim and
the elders extol Judith as the glory of Jerusalem, the joy of Israel, and honored by
her people.22 After these praises, the elders speak a number of conditional
statements. They commend Judith for acting in a manly way. 23 They note how she
17
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loved castitas in her heart.24 They recognize that Judith has known no other man
after Manasses died.25 Each of these factors were prerequisites for their final
statements. Because Judith had acted viriliter, had maintained her chaste heart, and
had remained a widow, the Lord strengthened her. Moreover, from these virtues
and the Lord’s strength, she would receive eternal blessing.26 The Septuagint text
details a similar blessing by the Lord, but beyond this similarity, the other aspects
of v. 11 are wholly introduced by Jerome.27 The alterations in this verse constitute
perhaps the most explicit revelation of Jerome’s agenda. Only by acting in a manly
fashion, demonstrated in masculine chastity, could Judith overcome Holofernes,
receive the Lord’s comfort, and gain eternity.
Although Jerome’s translation of Liber Iudith provides a plethora of
evidence for his culturally motivated rendering, a few other texts solidify the
arguments. In a letter from Jerome and a work from Ambrose, the prominent
Church Fathers further disclose their conception of chaste Christian widowhood.
These works mention Judith specifically. In an epistle, Jerome relates the account
of Judith as an example to the newly widowed Furia. The encouraging account of
“woman vanquishing men” and “chastity beheading lust” represents Jerome’s
dichotomized views.28 By juxtaposing these two sentiments, Jerome suggests that
Judith, only through her chastity, is able to overcome the lust of Holofernes.
Additionally, in the opinion of Ambrose, it is only through her chastity that Judith
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overcomes the Assyrians. 29 The triumph of Judith’s preserved chastity equals the
achievement of delivering her country.
For Ambrose and Jerome, the quality of Judith lies in her chastity. Their
sentiments are explicit in their own works, which readily reflect their opinions.
Moreover, the prologue to Liber Iudith allows Jerome to disclose some of his
preoccupations. Jerome’s opinions, however, become more problematic when
rendered in translation. In translation, the prescription of chastity for the Hebrew
widow Judith appears in various facets of the text. These occurrences represent
marked departures from the earlier Septuagint text. Even in translating, then,
Jerome’s agenda shines through. Whether made consciously or not, the translator
chooses specific instances to paint the text with his own hue. For the solidifying
Christian religion, chastity was paramount, and for Jerome, Judith’s story was
useful in depicting that virtue.
Elegance and Not Seduction: Depicting Judith as an Unadulterated Beauty
The account of Judith absorbs readers with compelling characters and a
relatable story. It is understandable why Jerome rendered it in Latin, even
considering his apparent reluctance evidenced by his prologue to Liber Iudith. The
most substantial translation variance used to Christianize Judith stems from
Jerome’s castitas additions. Given the importance of sexual continence to early and
later Christians, these additions should be largely unsurprising. Other slight
changes are also discernable in the texts. In both the Vulgate and Septuagint the
beauty of Judith is well-attested. However, the Septuagint characterizes Judith’s
beauty almost as a tool for sexual temptation. Jerome’s bowdlerizing sensibilities
compel the translator to curtail the alluring nature of the Hebrew woman, depicting
her elegance instead of her seductive nature.
Jerome’s translation demonstrates instances of the translator smoothing
over Judith’s beauty. The Vulgate entails a widow, just as stunning as her
Septuagint counterpart. Yet, there is a careful delineation of Judith’s beauty and her
use of it. An aesthetically pleasing appearance represents a central trait for good
women and men in the ancient world. This centrality was adopted by Christianity’s
architects and remained a defining feature of virtuous people in the Middle Ages.
However, beauty was not simply skin deep. Indeed, a beautiful body denoted a
beautiful soul.30 The most important difference stemmed from the employment of
attractiveness. As seen in the previous section, many of the Church Fathers
29
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regarded purity of the body as an imperative for all adherents. Jerome’s inclusion
of castitas throughout shows this preoccupation.
Thus, Jerome is faced with the prospect of keeping Judith’s beauty intact,
while also depicting her as unquestionably pure. The tying of Judith’s beauty and
piety is largely accomplished through castitas. Yet, other instances stand out in
Jerome’s translation upon its comparison to the Greek text. Following her
admonishment of Bethulia’s elders, Judith returns to her home in order to prepare
for her mission. In a montage akin to arming oneself for battle, Judith strips off the
garments of widowhood and washes herself in preparation. The widow dons
charming clothes and striking ornamentations. She, along with her servant girl, also
packs supplies which were in keeping with Hebrew food guidelines. The two set
out and find Ozias, the high priest of Bethulia, at the city gates.
In the midst of Judith’s preparations, Jerome deems the situation a fitting
location for a slight but noticeable departure from the original text. The Septuagint
summarizes her aesthetic preparations succinctly and sharply. “She made herself
up provocatively for the charming of the eyes of men,” reads the text, “all who
would cast eyes upon her.”31 This verse shows how the main purpose of Judith’s
beauty was for the provocation of men. Jerome, at least, appears to have read the
verse in this manner. He surely rails against this sentiment in his translation. Going
beyond simply truncating the problematic text, Jerome instead decides to inject his
own preoccupations.
After ornamenting herself, Jerome writes, “To [Judith], truly, truly, the Lord
bestowed brilliance: since all that arrangement was depending not from lust, but
from virtue: and therefore the Lord augmented this woman in that beauty, in order
that she was appearing in unique elegance in the eyes of all men.”32 A number of
aspects of this translational addition require examination. The first, and most
important, lies in the genesis of Judith’s beauty. The Septuagint text relates that
Judith made herself more beautiful, implicitly through her dress and jewelry in
addition to her already lovely appearance. Jerome describes her splendor as having
come from the Lord, instead of Judith herself. Moreover, the “arrangement”
depended not upon libido or provocation from Judith’s appearance as related in the
Septuagint. Rather, virtus is the basis of her plans. Because the plot rested upon
virtus and not libido, then, the Lord provides for the augmentation of Judith’s
beauty.
Finally, Jerome appears to smooth out the description of Judith’s
appearance in the eyes of men. She looks “uniquely elegant” in the eyes of all men.
The sharpness of the manly lustful gaze is dampened, and Judith emerges as an
31
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elegant beauty instead of a provocative seductress. The Septuagint translator writes
that as Judith dresses, she puts on clothes “with which she was accustomed to dress
in the days of the life of her husband Manasses.”33 While there is nothing explicitly
related to seduction in this remark, the mentioning of Judith’s deceased husband
apparently disturbs the Latin translator. This sentiment is entirely missing from
Jerome’s translation.
The purpose for this omission is twofold. On the one hand, Jerome’s
subordination of marriage to virginity is well-known.34 Additionally, Jerome
considers marriage as a lesser good than chaste widowhood. Judith’s purity bound
with her widowhood yields a good far beyond marriage. On the other hand, many
patristic writers considered marriage to be the only legitimate outlet for sexual
activity. By reminding readers of Judith’s marriage to Manasses, the Septuagint
writer also prompts readers of Judith’s story to remember aspects of her sexuality.
Jerome must do away with Judith’s sexuality while also elevating her as an
archetypical chaste widow, the second highest spiritual yield behind virginity.
The translator carefully delineates between Judith’s beauty and her usage of
it. The Hebrew widow’s beauty must remain intact, as a physically pleasing
appearance was a prerequisite for her virtue. Jerome has, however, pared away any
notion of a connection between beauty and lust. The Lord imparted beauty unto
Judith and ultimately blessed her mission due to her virtus. A good Christian widow
engaging in seduction would have been unthinkable. The extraction of beauty from
seduction essentially connects back to Jerome’s attempts to depict Judith’s
continence. She was elegant, not sultry. Furthermore, in Jerome’s mind, marriage
was largely without benefit. It seems that the only benefit of Judith’s marriage for
Jerome is the status it imparts unto the Hebrew widow, an aspect of Judith’s account
which is considered in the final section.
Memory of the Hebrew Woman: Status, Confrontation, and Holy Days
Jerome elucidates most explicitly the important facets of Christian
widowhood, continence and untainted beauty. He finally moves to illustrate other
aspects of Judith’s Christian-widow exemplarity. The translator maintains certain
criteria of Christian widows, including social status and confrontation with the
elders, and also adds the ascription of holy days to paradigmatic Christian figures
to Judith’s narrative. Admittedly, the addition of feast days in Jerome’s translation
is an argument from silence regarding the Septuagint text. Yet, there does not seem
to be an analogous piece in the Septuagint text that is comparable to the inclusion
33
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of Christian holy days. Moreover, social status and confrontation simply appear in
both the Vulgate and Septuagint, and thus these considerations diverge slightly
from the main thrust of the paper.
These aspects of the Hieronymian rendering of Liber Iudith are nonetheless
important. The growing need for institutionalized orthodoxy and orthopraxy
necessitated a full examination of widowhood in the case of Jerome’s translation.
The Jewess Judith needed to look as Christian as possible, while also providing an
idealized vision to Christian widows. The consistency of certain characteristics
facilitates this appearance. References to Judith’s extravagant wealth and status
occur unambiguously in both the Septuagint and Vulgate.35 Indeed, part of her plot
against Holofernes requires her to be sumptuously dressed.36 In addition to her
wealth, Judith’s social positionality rings through the Septuagint text as well as
Jerome’s translation.37 Her lineage and previous marriage also precedes her
account, only adding to her understood status.
Only after sketching her as the epitome of wealth and status in the Bethulian
community does the author feel confident enough to describe her encounter with
the town’s authorities. Jerome consciously follows this pattern as it coincides well
with his agenda for Judith. Status for women derived from their vast inherited
wealth and social position.38 A danger of that status, however, was expanded
agency on the part of widows. Increased agency could lead to attention and
resulting consequences, which was especially a problem in a society that did not
value women as full members. Such clout led to guards on their actions.39 Judith
needed her status accorded to her by wealth and position in order to confront the
doubting Ozias. Yet, after the Assyrians are dealt with, she resumes her life of
domestic asceticism.
Judith’s return to her previous life connects well with what seems to be
Jerome and others’ ideal for female ascetic practice. Women ascetics were often
represented conducting their renunciations in their familial household.40 The
earliest stages of Christianity could provide women with an opportunity for
rebellion as the burgeoning religion was at first at the margins of society like
women. Jerome, though, carefully avoids support for women in leadership or
clerical privilege.41 Yet, a subtle message remained: generally excessive female
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agency contravened the boundaries of tolerable diversity. It was one thing to admire
women such as Judith, but another thing entirely to imitate her. 42 The good
Christian widow could not assume a public role that would overstep “certain clearly
felt limits and thereby contradict that within her which remains female.”43
Admiration for holy persons could take a variety of forms, one of which
entailed feast days in remembrance of especially holy individuals. The Catholic
holy calendar is ripe with paragons and sainted men and women. A prominent
Hieronymian addition in the final verse of Judith’s account requires a final note.
Judith had done the impossible against Holofernes and the Assyrian hordes. The
widow challenged the men of her city who questioned God’s protection. She had
remained a prominent figure in Bethulia after her success. Even the high priest of
Jerusalem had commended her on her virtus and accomplishment. She returned to
a life of domestic asceticism and lived out the remnant of her life in continence and
sanctity.
Were Judith a Christian, her name may have been included in the list of
Catholic saints. But Judith was obviously Jewish. However, Jerome could not
forego the opportunity to give her a Christian hue one last time. The Septuagint text
closes with Judith’s burial and the assurance that none accosted Israel during
Judith’s life and “for many days after she had died.”44 The Vulgate follows this
reading, declaring to readers that none disturbed Israel. This verse does not close
the Latin translation though. In his prologue to Liber Iudith, Jerome appended to
his rendering, “Moreover, the day of this victory obtained a holiday by the Hebrews
in the number of holy days, and it was maintained by the Jews from that time, up
into the present day.”45
Hebrews celebrated various holy days. One for Judith probably would have
been out of the ordinary, at least for someone with a cursory understanding of
Jewish practice. The addition would not be unusual at all except for its glaring
absence in the Septuagint. One can only guess at Jerome’s specific motivations
here. The notion of a holy day tangentially dedicated to Judith might have been
reminiscent of the litany of Christian sancta and their feast days. Jerome might have
been giving encouragement to Christian widows, showing the possibilities of
dedicating their lives to piety and chastity using the widow Judith. Regardless of
specific motivations, Jerome’s general agenda remains the same in this final
alteration as it has been throughout the translation.
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Conclusion: Christiana illa
Throughout Jerome’s translation of Liber Iudith, the patristic writer works
to sketch Judith in the manner of an idealized Christian widow. This agenda, as has
been shown, appears explicitly when comparing Jerome’s translation to the earlier
Septuagint text. In his additions, glosses, and occasional textual removals, Jerome
fully demonstrates his intentions for the Hebrew widow. Even certain continuities
between the Septuagint and Vulgate texts show a consciousness in attempting to
sketch Judith as a character upon which Christian women, especially widows, could
draw.
The character trait for Jerome’s Judith was castitas. The term only appears
four times in Jerome’s translation, two of which occur in the Prologus. The
prologue gives readers an idea of Jerome’s main intent for the text. Judith ought to
be viewed as an example in many ways, but most importantly as an exemplum
castitatis. The additions in his translation are stark and their placement significant.
The first use comes in the form of a direct quote from the high priest of Jerusalem,
Joachim. Direct speech is especially useful as the author can impart vital ideas from
the mouths of important characters. The character being quoted also requires
thought. One of the highest-ranking authorities in all of Israel commends Judith for
her castitas.
The second usage of the term ties to virtus and the masculinization of Judith.
Continence increasingly was viewed as a masculine value. Moreover, for Christian
women to become virtuous, they needed to shed their femininity. Both of these
notions are demonstrated in Jerome’s Judith. Her abstinence is on display due to
Jerome’s work. She is also connected to virtus throughout. Additionally, Joachim
explains how Judith’s success was based on her masculinization and her chastity.
Only with these prerequisites could Judith overcome the Assyrians and Holofernes.
Finally, Jerome and his contemporary Ambrose show their undiluted perceptions
of widows generally and Judith specifically in their own works.
Jerome also understands how Judith’s beauty was imperative to both her
success and her virtue. In various departures from the Septuagint, Jerome carefully
maintains Judith’s incredible beauty, while also depicting it as a gift from God. As
a blessing from God, then, her exquisiteness and her plot against Holofernes needed
to be based upon virtus. God could not bless anything connected to libido, and so
all notions of seduction needed to be washed from the text. The dress and
ornamentation from her marriage might even be misconstrued as invoking her
sexuality, as marriage was the only legitimate outlet for sexuality. Jerome goes as
far as downplaying Judith’s marriage to Manasses in order to maintain her
unadulterated beauty.
That marriage, though, holds a slight use for bolstering Judith’s status.
Along with her inherited wealth and her irrefutable piety, Judith’s social standing
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in the Bethulian community looms largely in her story. This standing makes her
confrontation with the city’s elders possible. Yet, Judith understands her place well.
Once the threat of annihilation has passed, the Hebrew woman returns to a life of
domestic cloister. She is not forgotten though. According to Jerome’s translation
and not the Septuagint, her deeds live on as a holy day amongst the Hebrews. Such
an honor, outside of someone as accomplished as Judith, befitted only the most holy
of Christian men and women. While not the strongest point for Judith’s
Christianization, this conspicuous addition at the close of his translation leaves
careful readers emphatically and enduringly cognizant of Jerome’s program.
The story of Judith offers an exemplary picture of virtuous widowhood.
With an obvious awareness of this fact, Jerome had few qualms about adapting her
to his personal and institutional agenda. Making decisions that were culturally
motivated, Jerome depicted Judith in a manner more befitting an increasingly
Christianized world. Demands for Christian exemplum in that essentially novel
world also necessitated examples be drawn from many sources, Christian or not.
For these reasons, Judith may no longer be viewed as she was in the eyes of
Holofernes, who called her “Hebraea illa.,” or “that Hebrew woman.” Instead,
Judith may better be thought of as Jerome must have seen her, as Christiana illa.
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Pleasure in Virtue: The
Possibility of Willful Virtuous
Behavior
Kaleb TerBush
Abstract
Virtuous behavior has often been construed as having three requisite elements: right
action, done for the right reason, and also carried out with the “right feeling,” i.e.
without the contrary inclination of Aristotle’s merely continent individual. Some
have argued that even if the right motivating reason(s) for action might not be
directly within our power to act on at will, there are a number of steps we can take
in order to make ourselves more responsive to the appropriate reasons – thus giving
us indirect control over which reasons we take to be compelling. However, I believe
that such accounts emphasize the importance of right action done for the right
reason at the expense of giving a complete account of right feeling – and are thus
incomplete pictures of both virtuous behavior and the way in which it is, to a degree,
within our control, rather than solely a matter of moral luck. In this paper, I
elaborate on these views, arguing that if we can control our reasons-responsiveness,
it follows that we can likewise influence our sensitivity to what we have reason to
desire. If we can make ourselves responsive to the best reasons in support of what
we ought to desire, then in doing the right action for the right reason we will
presumably satisfy a desire of ours, and thus we will take pleasure in acting
virtuously, without a contrary inclination to do otherwise. And, I think this is true
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding the nature of both motivation and
desires. In this way, then, I argue that the necessary components for virtuous
behavior – doing the right action, for the right reason, and especially with the right
feeling – are truly “up to us” in large part, and not merely to chance.
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1. Moral Luck and the Possibility of Virtuous Behavior
Discussing moral luck, Thomas Nagel says that:
A person may be greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or
conceited, but behave perfectly by a monumental effort of will. To possess these
vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances…
people are morally condemned for such qualities, and esteemed for others equally
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.
To Kant this seems incoherent because virtue is enjoined on everyone and
therefore must in principle be possible for everyone. It may be easier for some than
for others, but it must be possible to achieve it by making the right choices, against
whatever temperamental background. One may want to have a generous spirit, or
regret not having one, but it makes no sense to condemn oneself or anyone else for
a quality which is not within the control of the will.1
He goes on to point out that Kant’s view “rules out moral judgement of many of the virtues
and vices,” as these are ostensibly out of our control. However, Nagel believes that such a
conclusion is “intuitively unacceptable”; even if one becomes convinced that it is
unjustifiable to judge agents based on virtues and vices supposedly not within their power
to influence, such evaluative sentiments “reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is
over.”
Two things become immediately clear from this discussion. The first is that, as I
believe Nagel rightly points out, we have a natural tendency to praise individuals with
certain character traits, dispositions, inclinations, and so on, and to blame those with others.
The second is that it seems to be of the utmost importance, morally-speaking, whether or
not these characteristics are in any way within our ability to control. Both Nagel and Kant
seem to believe that they are not, due to certain apparent facts about the nature of both
moral luck and our moral psychologies; therefore, they think that we must look elsewhere
than virtue and vice when assigning moral blame or praise.
On this picture, then, those who possess unvirtuous dispositions, feelings, and
attitudes – or, vices – are stuck with them, so to speak, and are thus routinely subject to our
(un)reflective moral blame. While they might be able to overcome said dispositions via a
“monumental effort of the will” and still act in conformity with what the virtuous individual
would do, and perhaps even do so for the right reason(s), they still do so in the face of a
contrary inclination to act otherwise. Per traditional conceptions of virtue, this ultimately
prohibits them from being considered fully virtuous. Instead, this person is akin to
Aristotle’s continent individual, whose “rational principle… urges them aright and towards
the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed… which
fights against and resists that principle.”2 So, the merely continent – and not virtuous –

Nagel, Thomas. “Moral Luck.” Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Print. 32-33.
2
Aristotle. Nichomacean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross, Batoche Books, 1999. Print. 19.
1
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person “acts with choice, but not with appetite”;3 they deliberately choose to act in the right
way for the right reason but fail to actually desire or take pleasure in doing so, instead
possessing a contrary inclination to act other than the way that they actually are. Thus, they
lack the right feeling4 generally considered necessary for virtuous behavior.
So, we can formulate three necessary conditions for fully virtuous behavior: (1)
doing the right action (2) for the right reason(s) and (3) with the right feeling, i.e. desiring
to act as such, taking pleasure in doing so, and/or without having a contrary inclination to
act otherwise.
At this point I have given a general definition for virtuous action, one that has three
requisite components. It seems plausible to assume, as I will for the rest of this essay, that
merely choosing and doing the right action (the one consistent with what virtue requires,
or what the virtuous individual would do) is something that is directly within our power.
In that sense, we have the ability, and thus presumably the moral responsibility, to at the
very least perform virtuous action(s)5 – fulfilling the first necessary condition for virtuous
behavior.
But of course, the right action can still be done for the wrong reason. Following
that, the extent of our abilities is less obvious when it comes to the second necessary
condition for virtuous behavior – acting on, from, or for the right reason(s), meaning those
reasons that are appropriate to and consistent with virtue, virtuous behavior, and/or what
the virtuous individual would do. Consider an example: we ought to help a friend in need
because we know that beneficence is a virtue (the right, appropriate, or virtuous reason),
and not because doing so might mean that said friend will owe us a favor in the future (the
wrong, inappropriate, or unvirtuous reason). Aristotle seems to assume that we are capable
of controlling our reasons for action, or what reasons we ultimately take to be motivating
and choose to act on.6 This is exhibited in his discussion of the continent individual, who
acts rightly merely on the basis of having adequately exercised their “rational principle.”
As Robert Audi7 has argued, however, it is far from clear that we are actually able to do
this in such a direct way, as Aristotle assumes. I will turn to this potentially troubling
possibility, as well as Audi’s discussion of it, in the next section.
Finally, what about satisfying the third and last necessary condition for virtuous
behavior – acting with the right feeling, as I have been putting it? Aristotle seems to believe
3

Id. at 37.
I will refer to the complex set of dispositions, inclinations, attitudes, and affective states that
characterize what Aristotle takes to be constitutive of the virtuous individual simply as possessing
the right “feeling.” I do so for simplicity’s sake – admittedly, though, potentially missing some of
the possible complexities involved.
5
Of course, there are often external constraints on our ability to act in a certain way, including and
especially in the way that morality mandates. Keeping in mind the “ought-implies-can” principle, I
will merely be considering cases where there are no such constraints on our ability to act virtuously.
I will also not be addressing the normative issue of what sort of actions virtue enjoins in this essay.
6
This is in direct conflict with the Humean view of the relationship between desire, reason, and
motivation. On such a view, the only real reasons to act are dependent in some way upon the desires
of the agent. I return to this debate later on.
7
Audi, Robert. “Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action.” Philosophical Issues, vol. 19, no. 1, 2009,
pp. 1-20.
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that adequate reasoning (i.e. seeing what the right reason to act is) and habituation (i.e.
acting rightly for the right reason consistently and routinely) is sufficient for one to
eventually take pleasure in acting virtuously, without the contrary inclination or desire that
would make them merely continent. If what Nagel says is true, however, this right feeling
requisite for truly virtuous behavior is in fact not directly within our power to regulate due
to facts about our moral psychologies and/or moral luck that are seemingly beyond our
control. This would put willfully being virtuous out of our reach. And, this would be true
no matter how much effort we expend and even if we do the right action(s) for the right
reason(s). I will return to this worry towards the end of my paper.
2. Reasons-Responsiveness: Influencing Our Sensitivity to Reasons for Action
Assuming that the capacity to act in some way that we have chosen – namely, to
do the action consistent with what the virtuous person would do – is within our power, we
have satisfied the first necessary condition for virtuous behavior. Let us now turn to the
second condition, which requires that one acts for, on, or is ultimately motivated by the
right reason(s). On the one hand, philosophers since Aristotle have presupposed that in
some sense we have the ability to willfully determine what reason(s) to act on. Robert Audi,
however, has argued that we in fact do not have the ability to exert such direct control over
our reasons for action – and if that “disturbing… even paradoxical” conclusion is true, then
virtue is not completely “up to us,” as commonly presupposed.
Instead, Audi believes that we actually have indirect control over our reasons for
action. This is because we are able to influence, via a number of means, our responsiveness
to reasons, including and especially the ones that are consistent with virtue. I will return to
Audi’s argument explaining why he thinks this but will first draw out the problem a bit
further.
Audi uses a number of examples to highlight the disparity that can, and often does,
arise between what we see as either good or bad reason(s) to act, and which reason(s) we
are actually inclined, compelled, and ultimately motivated to act upon. He characterizes
this relationship as follows:
Suppose, for instance, that I am inclined to A [where A is a virtuous action] for a
bad reason [i.e. one not in line with virtue] but have a good reason [i.e. one in line
with virtue] to A. If I can bring it about at will [my emphasis] that either (1) I
believe I should A for the good reason or (2) I want (strongly enough) to A for a
good reason, I can thereby causing [sic] acting virtuously, i.e. A-for-r, where r is a
good reason to A and of a kind appropriate to some virtue. This would mean we
could sometimes act virtuously, and perhaps contribute to becoming virtuous or to
strengthening our virtuous character if we already have it, just by a kind of mental
exertion: what some would call a volition.8
In other words, he takes this to be a technical characterization of the sort of capacity
presupposed in virtue theory since Aristotle: if we adequately understand that some reason
8
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is the one consistent with virtue and thus the one that we ought to act on, then by some
internal process we can will ourselves, as it were, to actually take said reason to be the
overridingly motivating one by acting on it. If such a process is possible, he believes, then
it must be formulated as such. Audi concludes, though, that so characterized “[i]t is
doubtful that we have the kind of direct voluntary power just illustrated.”9 As he points out,
the truth of this apparent fact about our moral psychologies worryingly entails that being
completely virtuous is not attainable solely by some amount of mental effort. Instead, the
ability to actually take the good reasons to be motivating is merely a matter of our
happening to have the correct sorts of temperaments, personalities, dispositions, and
inclinations – in other words, the things constitutive of virtuous character. Audi does
believe that this claim about our (in)ability to “harness” or “unharness” certain reasons
voluntarily is true. But he also believes that “how virtuous our actions are… can be very
largely up to us.”10 How can he possibly hold both of these views?
Audi thinks that instead of having direct control over our reasons for action, we
actually have indirect control over them, via our ability to influence which reasons we are
sensitive to. He believes that this is possible because he considers our understanding of our
reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds supporting doing the action in question.
Likewise, this entails that influencing our reasons for action involves influencing our
beliefs about the “grounds supporting the action… [t]his is because what we believe,
especially in normative matters, tends (if we are rational) to affect our actions, and is (other
things equal) more likely to do so if vividly in consciousness.” Simply put, Audi takes our
perception of the motivating strength of a reason for action to be belief(s) about the strength
of the grounds that support performing the action. So, while we might not be able to directly
control our reasons for action in the same way that we cannot simply will ourselves to
believe something, it certainly is the case that we can influence our beliefs by making
ourselves more responsive to certain justificatory reasons. In the same vein, then, Audi
believes that we can influence which reasons for action we take to be motivating by making
ourselves more responsive to the reasons supporting having some belief about the grounds
supporting doing some action – namely, those good reasons that are consistent with those
that the virtuous individual would act on.
Because Audi takes our reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds we have
for acting in some way, he also thinks that the methods we use for regulating our beliefs
are also capable of allowing us to influence our reasons for action. If he is right in this, then
it seems within our ability to make ourselves more amenable to certain reasons for action,
ideally making the good reasons for action more forceful and thus overwhelmingly
motivating to us. And crucially, our ability to indirectly control our reasons for action via
directly influencing our reasons-responsiveness would put virtue back within our reach.
This is, again, because virtue requires that we act from, for, or on the right reason(s) –
something which does now appear to be within our power. For Audi, we merely have to
fulfill the five “domains of moral responsibility” that he lays out, which are really just
methods of regulating belief-formation.

9
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Id. at 17-18.

10

51

The five domains, per Audi, are as follows.11 The first is the seeking of relevant
reasons and counter-reasons for action that are “relevant to whatever matter is at hand,” as
doing so “can give wider scope to nature in regulating conduct and richer content to our
discourse in explaining or justifying our actions.” The second is the seeking of reflective
equilibrium, or consistency amongst our set(s) of beliefs. The third is the clear and
deliberate identification of, emphasis on, and assessment of reasons; in this way, we can
better understand what beliefs and thus reasons for action we actually have and/or ought to
have. The fourth is interpersonal comparison of reasons for action so that we can share
evidence, erase bias, and ultimately have stronger agreement and communication about the
grounds supporting acting in some way. The fifth and last is both recognizing and removing
“a degree of motivation disproportional to the [actual] normative strength of our grounds.”
This is akin to seeing that one holds a belief with “unjustified confidence,” then
understanding that one ought to not do so.
I hope the point of this discussion is clear. Recall that the second necessary
condition for virtuous action requires that it be done for the right reason. Audi argues that
while we have good reason to think that we do not have direct control over our reasons for
actions, we luckily seem to be capable of influencing which reasons we find compelling.
So, although we cannot directly, willfully, and deliberately (un)harness the (in)appropriate
reasons – those that are (in)consistent with virtue – we can, instead, epistemically conduct
ourselves in such a way as to make ourselves more responsive and sensitive to, and thus
more likely to be motivated by, the reasons consistent with virtuous behavior. If what Audi
has said thus far is correct – which I take it to be and will assume it is for the rest of this
essay – getting ourselves to be motivated by the right reasons is, albeit indirectly,
something that we are capable of deliberately doing.
3. Taking Pleasure in Virtuous Action
Thus far, I take myself to have given a definition of virtuous behavior that lays out
its three constitutive components. I also hope to have, invoking Audi’s research, shown
that at this point two out of those three elements are, more or less, within our ability to
ensure: namely, that both right action and acting for the right reason(s) are “up to us,” rather
than relegated to the domain of Nagel’s moral luck. So far, then, this at least partially
preserves the possibility of willful virtuous behavior as traditionally characterized.
Yet, Audi peculiarly fails to explicitly mention anything regarding how one feels
when doing the right action for the right reason. But as previously discussed, this is often
considered the third and last necessary condition for virtue.
Let me get clearer about how I believe Audi conceives of virtuous behavior.
Admittedly, he never explicitly defines his conception and only does so “implicitly.”12 In
his own words, “acting virtuously… is acting on the basis of motivation [sic] and beliefs
whose content has a sufficiently close relation to the elements essential in the trait
constituting the virtue in question.” In other words, Audi thinks that virtuous behavior is
only virtuous insofar as it is rooted in virtuous character. In this way, it looks as if he is
11
12
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positing another necessary condition essential to virtuous behavior: that the agent also
possesses the virtue qua specific character trait, quality, disposition, inclination, etc.
relevant to the situation, action, and reason(s) at hand.
However, when requiring that an agent have the relevant virtue necessary for the
behavior to be considered virtuous, I believe that Audi likely has something in mind akin
to my conception of right feeling. I think this interpretation of Audi’s view is plausible
because it seems fair to assume that if an agent has a temperamental propensity to act in a
certain manner, then they will by definition not have a contrary inclination against acting
in the way consistent with said disposition. If the disposition is a virtuous one, it follows
that they will also not have a contrary inclination to act unvirtuously and will thus act
without the desire to do otherwise, making their behavior fully virtuous. So rather than
stipulating a fourth necessary condition, I take Audi to actually be offering a different
formulation of the third necessary condition for virtuous behavior that I have been
discussing throughout this paper – namely, that the right action done for the right reason
be performed with the right feeling.
Returning to the possibility of virtuous behavior, then, if my interpretation of Audi
is correct, the question now becomes: are our dispositions within our control in a way such
that we can willfully influence ourselves so as to not have a contrary inclination against
acting in a way consistent with virtue? Are we able to cultivate within ourselves, despite
whatever we have or have not been granted by the deliverances of moral luck, the capacity
to desire to act virtuously and to thus take pleasure in doing so? While the first version of
the question emphasizes merely not having a contrary inclination and the second actually
taking pleasure in acting virtuously, I believe that both are accurately captured by the term
“right feeling.” If one is disposed to act in some way and is able to act in a way consistent
with that disposition, then by definition one does not have a contrary inclination.13 Suppose
I have a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends and that I am confronted by a
situation in which I am able to act in a beneficent manner towards a friend of mine; a
contrary inclination to act non-beneficently is presumably nowhere to be found, and I will
also likely take pleasure acting in accordance with my disposition, as it were, by acting in
a beneficent way.14
To frame the issue another way: the earlier passage from Nagel suggested that “to
possess… vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances”
13

In other words, I believe it would be contradictory to say that an agent can have two concurrent
but contradictory dispositions; while we certainly can have conflicting reasons for action, it does
not seem to be the case that we similarly can have contradictory propensities to act in certain ways.
For example, I might have two different reasons to act beneficently towards a friend – a selfinterested one and an altruistic one, perhaps. However, it does not seem plausible in this case that I
could have both a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends in conjunction with a
disposition to not act beneficently towards my friends. In some sense, then, reasons seem specific
to instances, while dispositions to act in some way are by definition less instance-specific and more
general in nature.
14
While we clearly can have dispositions that we do not take pleasure in acting upon, it seems that
such cases are limited to those dispositions that are already decidedly unvirtuous – because we
recognize them as such. Conversely, I find it plausible that we take a sort of second-order pleasure
in acting in consistency only with our dispositions that are virtuous.
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and that “people are morally condemned for… qualities, and esteemed for other equally
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.” From this he
characterizes the Kantian view as saying that “it makes no sense to condemn oneself or
anyone else for a quality which is not within the control of the will.” In these few phrases,
there are a number of claims and assumptions about morality and agency that I believe are
not as obvious as Nagel and Kant take them to be. Specifically, I doubt it really true that
having a vice is simply being “unable to help having certain feelings” and that certain
qualities of character are really “beyond control of the will.” I believe, contra Nagel, that
these things are (to an extent) not beyond control of the will and that further, we are able
to play an active role in what feelings we have when acting – because of our ability to
effect which reasons we are responsive to.
To explain why I think this, we need to return to Audi’s views. I believe they are
accurate yet incomplete in virtue of not adequately addressing the requirement for virtuous
behavior that one act with the right feeling. If my interpretation of Audi’s views is correct,
he only satisfactorily describes the way in which willfully becoming continent – but not
virtuous! – is within our control. He explains how we can get ourselves to be motivated by
the right reasons when doing the right action, but says little to nothing about ridding
ourselves of any contrary inclinations against doing so; he only gestures at the role of
virtuous character in meeting the requirements for virtuous behavior, which as I have
argued is plausibly his attempt at discussing the requisite right feeling I am concerned with.
Thus, I believe Audi has only gotten us two-thirds of the way in justifying the view that
virtue is “up to us” and not a matter of moral luck. To give a complete account of the way
in which it is within our ability to deliberately satisfy the three necessary conditions for
virtuous behavior, one must effectively explain the way in which we can willfully conduct
ourselves so as to have the right feeling(s), the lack of which prevents Aristotle’s continent
individual from becoming a truly virtuous one. I now turn to that task.
4. Desiring Virtue
My current aim is to show that we are capable of willfully conducting ourselves
such that we can have some version and amount of control over our inclinations and
dispositions – including, importantly, those that are contrary to virtue – in order to show
that we are capable of intentionally and deliberately doing not just the right action for the
right reason, but also ensuring we do so with the right feeling requisite for virtuous
behavior.
It has traditionally been held by philosophers discussing virtue that routinely acting
in the right way for the reason is generally sufficient to cause an agent to lose their contrary
inclinations to act otherwise. For example, in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
discusses what he takes to be the necessary role that habit(uation) plays in the cultivation
and development of virtue. Similarly, Audi briefly mentions that “… as with most kinds of
virtuous actions, regularly acting generously [or in some other virtuous manner] is likely
to lead to developing the trait in question….”15 These are empirical claims, but I think it is
fair to say that they are likely accurate ones. So, if it is true that regularly acting doing the
15
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right action for the right reason will likely lead one to acquire the trait or disposition that
constitutes having some virtue, then it follows that habituation is the means by which one
can ultimately behave in a virtuous manner.
However, Aristotle can be interpreted as simply assuming this to be the case in
regard to our moral psychologies. Audi also appears to be making a similar move in
presuming the legitimacy of this method. And although I agree that habituation is likely
the means by which we develop the dispositions qua virtues of character that allow us to
act without the contrary inclinations of the merely continent person, in the remainder of
this essay I would like to give a more fine-grained analysis of just what this process
involves. Moreover, I want to give such an account whilst keeping in mind that I, along
with Aristotle and Audi, am arguing that virtue is “up to us” in large part. I want to
demonstrate that it is within our power to willfully conduct ourselves in such a way so as
to lose our contrary inclinations against acting virtuously and to consequently take pleasure
in doing so – in other words, to show that we can largely control our dispositions and thus
feelings, and consequently satisfy in a very deliberate manner the last necessary condition
for virtuous behavior by desiring to act as such. Habituation is certainly the crux of not just
cultivating virtuous action and increasing sensitivity to the right sort of reasons, but also
(perhaps most importantly) of ridding ourselves of inclinations. However, I also believe
that there is more to be said about just what occurs during habituation than is discussed by
Aristotle and Audi. I believe that we have the ability to rid ourselves of contrary
inclinations against acting virtuously. But just why do I think we are capable of doing this
in a way above and beyond merely acting habitually16 in a certain way for certain reasons?
5. The Cultivation of Virtuous Desires
In the remainder of this essay, I will offer a brief sketch outlining the way in which
I believe that transitioning from being merely continent to fully virtuous is something that
is, to an extent, within our power rather than a matter of the moral luck discussed by Nagel
and Kant. Just like we have control over which actions we choose to do and which reasons
we are responsive to, I also take it that we likewise have a modicum of control over how
we feel when doing the right actions for the right reasons. If what I say is correct, then all
of the necessary components for virtuous behavior are at least partially within our ability
to willfully influence and ultimately attain if we are purposely aim at doing so – especially
including the way we feel when acting. In other words, the potential problem Audi initially
raised for virtue theory, which I take him to have only partially dissolved, can be adequately
accounted for. This, in turn, readmits the possibility of virtuous behavior, putting it out of
the skeptic’s reach and back within our own. What follows is a short argument as to why I
think this is the case.
Recall Audi’s view that our understanding of our reasons for action are really just
16

While habituation is a coherent means of actively and willfully cultivating virtue, it does not by
any means guarantee it; Audi himself notes this. For example, it seems entirely possible that one
could grow to dislike acting in a certain way the more one does it, and that the strength of one’s
contrary inclination(s) will increase accordingly. I want to argue, therefore, that there are steps we
can deliberately take that reduce the likelihood of this decidedly unvirtuous possibility.
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constituted by our beliefs about the strength of the grounds that support performing some
action. From this, he argues that via being able to influence our beliefs, we can likewise
influence our responsiveness to certain reasons, namely the right or appropriate ones that
are consistent with acting virtuously. In this way, we have indirect control over what
reasons we ultimately take to be motivating. We cannot at will choose to act on a reason,
even if we know it is the one that we ought to be acting on; however, there are certain
epistemic procedures we can routinely practice so as to make ourselves more responsive to
the reasons that we really ought to be acting on.
So, per Audi let us grant that we can influence both which reasons we are
responsive to and, because of that fact, what we believe. Broadly speaking, like Aristotle’s
continent individual we can presumably use our “rational principle” to see what action(s)
virtue requires of us, as well as what the virtuous reason for doing said action is. By
understanding those facts and then fulfilling some or all of Audi’s five domains of moral
responsibility qua epistemic practices, we can make the right reason(s) actually motivating
to or for us. But again, what about how we feel when acting in accordance with virtue by
doing the right actions for the right reasons(s)? If we act whilst still feeling a contrary
“appetite,” or inclination, then we are merely continent and not truly virtuous. If Audi’s
account is correct, we can see what the good, right, and appropriate reasons for action are
and make ourselves more sensitive to and motivated by those reasons that are consistent
with virtue. However, his views, while accurate as they stand, are incomplete because they
only demonstrate the possibility of willful continence, and not willful virtue.
Building on Audi’s analysis, though, I believe that it follows from his discussion
of our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness that the right feeling requisite for
behavior to meet the criteria for being virtuous is something that we can willfully cultivate,
because of the relationship between reasons, beliefs, and desires.
My central point is that, similarly to the way in which we can apparently influence
our receptivity to reasons for belief and action, we can therefore: see what we have reason
to desire, including and especially per the dictates of virtue; make ourselves more
responsive to and motivated by those reasons; instill within ourselves those appropriate,
virtuous desires; and then, ultimately act in accordance with those desires whilst lacking
any contrary inclination(s) and thus presumably taking pleasure in doing so. In other words,
it seems that via our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness, we can plausibly
influence our responsiveness to the reasons supporting not just we have reason to do or
believe but also what we have reason to desire. And if we desire to act in some way for
some reason, and then actually do act in said way for said reason, we necessarily do so
without a contrary inclination (because we desire to act in this way rather than another) and
presumably take pleasure (broadly speaking, desire-satisfaction results in some sort of
pleasure) in doing so – making the behavior virtuous rather than merely continent.
Per Audi our comprehension of our reasons for action is constituted by beliefs
regarding the grounds supporting doing some action, and because we have the ability to
influence what we believe, we can thus influence our proclivity to be motivated by the right
reasons – not just those supporting certain beliefs and actions, but also desires. Further, I
take there to be a parallel between beliefs and desires in the sense that they are both
intentional states – we believe something, just as we desire something. In this way, if
something is true about beliefs, then in a general sense it is prima facie plausible to think
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that that same thing holds regarding desires as well. And, one thing that seems true about
our beliefs is that they are informed by reasons; we often believe what we believe on the
basis of the strength of the grounds qua reasons in support of believing that thing. Likewise,
I want to argue as intentional states akin to beliefs, desires are in some sense similarly
influenced by reason(s). Of course, this prompts the question: are desires directly informed
by reason(s), or are desires informed by beliefs which are themselves informed by
reason(s)? This can be respectively formulated in two different ways: one, with desires
being directly informed by reasons alone, without any mediating beliefs in between; or
two, with desires being influenced by beliefs and then with desire-informing-beliefs
themselves informed by reasons. For my purposes, I will leave this as an open question.
My main claim is that our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness realistically
entails that we can influence our desires; because reasons and our sensitivity to them play
an essential role in each interpretation, I take it to be one of the upshots of my argument
that it can accommodate both of the above formulations about the relation between reasons,
beliefs, and desires.
To summarize, my primary assertion is this: we have the ability to influence our
reasons-responsiveness such that we can willfully be more sensitive to those reasons that
are consistent with virtue, and because of this ability we can deliberately influence our
sensitivity to reasons regarding what we have reason to desire, and thus willfully guide our
desires themselves (to an extent). In turn, by being able to cultivate within ourselves the
desire to act in consistency with virtue and in conjunction with then doing the right actions
for the right reasons, we will likely take pleasure in doing so, without any contrary
inclinations, ultimately making us fully virtuous rather than merely continent in a way that,
above and beyond the deliverances of moral luck, is actually “up to us.” And while only a
preliminary outline, I believe that my view as presented is a plausible one on its face. In
that spirit, I now turn to and will spend the remainder of this essay responding to two
preliminary objections.
6. Humean Motivation and Belief-Desire Bootstrapping
Thus far, I have proposed that we can actively cultivate the appropriate virtuous
desires that would allow us to satisfy the third and last necessary condition for virtuous
behavior: taking pleasure in acting virtuously, without a contrary inclination against doing
so, because we have a desire to act virtuously – or, acting with the right feeling. I have
argued that this is because, per Audi’s arguments, it seems that even if we cannot willfully
choose what reasons we act on, we can influence and increase our responsiveness to the
right reasons, which will then, in turn, cause us to have the appropriate beliefs and desires
that are requisite for both being motivated by the right reason(s) and for carrying out the
action with the right feeling. In this way, the satisfaction of all three necessary conditions
for virtue – including and especially the last one – are within our power, to a degree, to
actively, willfully, and deliberately cultivate.
However, there are two objections that come to mind when considering my
proposal that our desires and thus the capacity to take pleasure in acting virtuously is
something that is within our control. The first comes from a set of views regarding the
relationship between reason, desire, and motivation, taking after Hume’s belief that “reason
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is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” and arguing that any account – including
mine – that claims reason can in some way motivate behavior is mistaken from the outset;
rather, only desires can be motivating, and reason both cannot and should not have any
prominent role in explaining motivation. The second objection says that just as seeing what
we have reason to do is often not enough to actually motivate us to act in that way and/or
on the basis of that reason, merely seeing what we have reason to desire is not sufficient,
on its own, to actually cause us to have to have that desire.
The first objection to my proposal, then, arises out of the Humean view regarding
motivation.17 I will only briefly describe the view, as my aim is not to refute it but rather
show how my proposal is entirely consistent with its picture of the relationship between
reason, desire, and motivation. Briefly put, and substituting Hume’s “passions” for desires,
the Humean picture is as follows: regarding our practical, means-end reasoning about how
to act, desires are the only thing able to produce ends, while reason, on the other hand, can
only produce beliefs. Because of this, desires are the only sort of thing that can be and
actually are motivating; reason on its own is insufficient to “generate… [the] impulse”18
necessary for action. A key part of my proposal is that we both can and should use reason,
via influencing our reasons-responsiveness, to cause ourselves to carry out the right action
on the basis of the right reason and with the right feeling, the latter of which I argued arises
from having the right desires. Such a proposal, then, is clearly at odds with Hume’s claim
that our rationality and actions are beholden to our desires.
I believe, however, that my proposal is entirely consistent with the Humean view
of motivation, and that this is true regardless of whether or not that view is in fact true.
Recall that I am arguing that because of our ability to play an active part in influencing our
reasons-responsiveness and thus belief formation, we can make therefore make ourselves
see what we have reason to desire and actually take those reasons to be compelling, which
conceivably eventually instills those desires within us. Hume’s view is that only desires
can be motivating, but it is compatible with such an outlook that our reasons can and do
inform our desires, as I am claiming. In other words, for Hume using reason to arrive at a
belief regarding what ends we ought to have is insufficient; we also need to actually desire
that end in order to be motivated to act in such a way as to attain it. Yet, we often use reason
to deliberate about what we ought to desire, and it is consequently entirely plausible that
reasoning about what we ought to desire actually informs what desires we ultimately end
up possessing. My proposal is that we can make ourselves responsive to the appropriate
reasons in support of beliefs about what we ought to desire, with the underlying implication
that we ought to desire to act virtuously.19 That is, we do the epistemic practices that make
us sensitive to the best reasons; we become sensitive to those reasons, which support having
some beliefs about what we ought to desire; we then end up with the belief about what we
I rely on Amy Schmitter’s interpretation of Hume here. Schmitter, Amy M., "17th and 18th
Century Theories of Emotions." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2016 Edition,
ed. Edward N. Zalta.
17

18

Id.
That is, I am referencing the widely-held view that the dictates of morality and virtue are in some
sense reason-granting. While accounts as to the source of that granting of reasons for action and
belief differ, the stance itself is widely held as a constituent feature of moral discourse.
19
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ought to desire; and because we are actually compelled by those reasons, the belief about
what we ought to desire often results in our actually having that desire.20 And because we
now actually have the desire to act virtuously, we satisfy the Humean condition requisite
for actually motivating us to act in that manner. Just as Hume thinks it is impossible to
even use rationality itself without the prior desire to do so, I hold that it is likewise
incoherent to think that reason plays no part in informing or creating our desires.21 If the
Humean view of motivation is true, my proposal can accommodate it; if it is false, then so
much the better for me.
The second objection turns out to be closely related to the first, and I have already
partially addressed it. It holds that merely seeing what we have reason to desire – in other
words, having a belief about what we ought to desire – is insufficient on its own to actually
cause us to have the desire in question. This certainly occurs; we often have beliefs about
what we ought to desire but fail to have the corresponding desire itself. I believe, though,
that this is more unlikely and implausible when it comes to matters concerning morality
and virtue. By definition, ethics deals with agency and normativity – specifically regarding
what we ought to do, but as I have discussed there is a close relationship in virtue theory
between what we ought to do and what beliefs and desires we ought to have. Generally
speaking, I take there to be a common awareness qua belief that morality involves reasongiving imperatives, and that therefore most people have some sort of a set of beliefs and
desires regarding what we ought to do – maybe just a belief that there are some things we
ought to do, and just a desire to do the things that we ought to do. Assuming the truth of
the objection, it is still plausible that we can bootstrap up, as it were, from those
aforementioned initial desires and beliefs to arrive at the higher-order beliefs and desires
necessary for virtue, by using our agential reason-responsiveness-influencing capacities (a
la Audi) to create these “new” beliefs and desires. In this way, it is not as if the beliefs and
desires essential for virtue need to be spontaneously generated; rather, they can be
grounded in broad, general beliefs and desires that we all already have merely in virtue of
being agents with agency participating in moral practice and discourse. And this is
20

This, of course, is the controversial part of my thesis. I admit that there is likely no necessary
connection here; there do seem to be cases where we have a belief about what ought to desire without
actually having the corresponding desire. I do believe, however, that my thesis does generally hold
in the context of morality generally and specifically virtue. Presumably, if one arrives at the belief
that one ought to desire to act virtuously, then the aforementioned sort of disjunction will not occur.
If one is not just aware that it is commonly held that that one ought to desire to act virtuously but
actually believes that they ought to desire to act virtuously, then I take it to be fair to say that one
will then actually have that desire. The key elements here are actually having the belief, and the
parallel that I take there to be between beliefs regarding acting in some way and beliefs regarding
desiring something; if I have a belief about what I ought to have a belief about, then I almost
assuredly actually end up having that latter belief – it makes no sense to say that I would not.
Similarly, if I have a belief about what I ought to desire (namely, acting virtuously), it seems likely
that I will actually end up with that desire.
21
While clearly some, perhaps many, of our desires are a-rational or irrational, it is similarly clear
that many of our desires arise as the result of rational deliberation and/or on the basis of reasons. I
desire to write and complete this essay because there are many reasons in support of why I ought to
desire to do so: to get a good grade in my seminar, to think carefully about an interesting
philosophical topic, to have a potential writing sample for doctoral applications, and so on.
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precisely what I think is implicitly occurring in both Audi and Hume’s accounts, as for
morality to even get off the ground, as it were, we have to have certain beliefs and desires,
as well as the means to rationally navigate them during practical deliberation whilst aiming
at behaving virtuously.
7. Conclusion: Is Virtue Up to Us?
In this paper, I wish to have accomplished a number of things. Mainly, I hope to
have convincingly demonstrated that taking pleasure in virtuous action by desiring to act
virtuously is something that we can deliberately and willfully cultivate, which would mean
that virtuous behavior is “up to us,” to an extent, and not purely a matter of moral luck. I
gave an account of what virtuous behavior is and what it requires: right action, done for
the right reason, and done with the right feeling. Drawing on Audi’s work, I showed that
the first two of these three elements is indirectly within our power to ensure. I then argued
that in the same way we can make ourselves responsive to virtuous reasons for action, we
can similarly make ourselves more responsive to reasons regarding what we ought to desire
– namely, to act virtuously. In this way, I concluded that we can conceivably cause
ourselves to have the desires necessary for one to take pleasure in virtuous action, without
a contrary inclination to do otherwise that prevents the continent person from being a
virtuous one. And, I think this is true due to the nature of morality and agency itself, and
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding motivation and desires.
Briefly put, I have argued that the actions, reasons for action, and now desires
requisite for virtuous behavior are not merely a matter of moral luck and are rather, in large
part, under our control, if we choose to put in the effort – and of course, we ought to. This
leads to an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title of this section: virtue is, in
fact, largely up to us.
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Subjective Religiosity and
Organized Religiosity as a
Predictor of Sexual Affect
among African Americans
Janelle B. Grant & Kyla Day
Fletcher
Abstract
Historically, religiosity and attendance at a church with a majority African
American or Black population was of practical value for African Americans. These
branches of practicality extended to sexual health, such as delayed sexual
intercourse and higher instances of using contraception. Overall, however, public
sexual discourses show some African American communities as “at risk” regarding
sexual health, which can make an African American individual feel negatively
about their sexual experiences. The current study aimed to understand how
subjective religiosity and organized religiosity influenced African Americans to
experience a positive, negative, or shameful sexual affect. We found that higher
levels of subjective religiosity, meaning a personal form of religion and not just
physical attendance at a religious institution, was positively correlated with a
positive sexual affect among our sample of African Americans (N = 725, r = .11, p
= .02). Through regression analysis, subjective religiosity was more influential in
predicting sexual affect than organized religious involvement. The implications
show that to gain support for sexual decisions and behaviors, African American
individuals in religious communities will pick and choose what principles remain
beneficial and applicable from religious teachings and utilize them to form their
own subjective religiosity that supports their sexual experiences.
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Religious traditions and beliefs, such as holidays with religious
backgrounds and the American Pledge of Allegiance, pervade American society,
but for African Americans, religion is historically of specific personal value. This
is marked by individual importance, using the church as a place of solace, and the
creation of a community that endorses common beliefs (Taylor & Chatters, 2010).
Religiosity is operationalized and will be further defined in two ways: organized
religiosity and subjective religiosity. Sexual affect, an individual’s feelings about
their own sexual experience, encompasses those subjective emotions, and it is
necessary to understand the factors that influence sexual affect, which is what this
study aims to accomplish. Moreover, it is important to include African Americans
in research about sexual affect and religiosity because much research portrays
African Americans to be at a deficit rather than a strength-based position regarding
sexual health (Fletcher et al., 2015).
The aim of this research is to identify emotions among African Americans
about sexuality and sexual decisions concerning religiosity, which can help
religious communities identify shortcomings and facilitate better support for their
community members. Subjective emotions regarding personal sexual experiences
are defined as an individual’s sexual affect. Sexual affect is a factor of emotional
sexual health. Consequently, African American sexual discourses that are
influenced by religion have the potential to be a platform to promote a healthy or
positive sexual affect that will facilitate sexual communication, awareness of
contraception, and religious community support based on sexual decisions and
behaviors (Taylor & Chatters, 2010). The current study aims to create a holistic
picture of sexual health and seeks to give importance to sexual affect as a factor of
sexual health.
Sexual Health and its Relation to Religiosity
According to the Pew Forum (2018), 79% of African Americans reported
their belief in God as “absolutely certain” compared with reported numbers of 48%
White, 25% Latino, and 17% Asian American. Such reported numbers are why
African Americans are of particular interest for this study. Many times, morals and
values that are facilitated through religion and spirituality generally have protective
effects on African Americans as a whole (Gutierrez, Goodwin, Kirkinis, & Mattis,
2014; Udell, Donenberg, & Emerson, 2011; Wills, Gerrard, Murray, & Brody,
2003). These protective effects of religiosity and spirituality also extend to aspects
of sexual health, such as delayed first sexual intercourse and greater self-regulation
(Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh, 2014; Watterson & Giesler, 2012).
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Organized Religiosity
Diener, Tay, and Myers (2011) found that subjective well-being was
principally brought about when participants felt social support, respect, and purpose
from their religious communities. Therefore, if support, respect, and purpose were
conveyed by organized religiosity, then subjective well-being was facilitated in
African American religious institutions and attendance was retained. Conversely,
if support, respect, and purpose were not shown, then African American individuals
were more likely to leave the institution or practice personal forms of the religion
outside of the institution (Diener et al., 2011).
When individuals feel like their sexuality (e.g., gay, lesbian, premarital sex)
is incongruent with their religious communities, they are more likely to rely on
personal beliefs instead of religious communities to resolve emotional conflicts.
(Sherry, Adelman, Whilde, & Quick, 2010; Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh, 2014).
This emotional conflict can cause a negative or shameful sexual affect when a
religious community does not support or respect an individual’s sexuality or sexual
behavior.
Subjective Religiosity
Although African Americans repeatedly report a higher level of importance
of religion than do Caucasians, it does not mean that their church attendance
follows suit. In fact, Hudson, Purnell, Duncan, and Baker (2015) found no
significant differences in levels of church attendance among each ethnic group, but
African Americans still report higher levels of subjective well-being than do
Caucasians. Therefore, if African Americans choose to take their religion outside
of the brick and mortar of an institution, they may practice their personal beliefs,
like accepting homosexuality and premarital sex, instead of traditional institutional
morals, like exclusively heterosexual relationships and marital sex.
Placing a larger importance on subjective religiosity instead of organized
religious involvement does not mean that African Americans do not think about the
beliefs and religious sexual code of conduct they were taught in a religious
institution. African Americans who reported having significant involvement in
church as adolescents still thought about religious beliefs they were taught as they
grew older (Taylor, Chatters, & Joe, 2011). Often, African Americans report that
not returning to their religious institutions is to avoid gossip and rejection from their
religious communities about their sexuality and sexual decisions (Quinn, DicksonGomez, & Kelly, 2016).
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Religiosity as a Predictor of Sexual Affect
Individuals can experience negative sexual affect because of the
collaboration of religiosity and sexual decisions. For example, if an individual feels
as if they are not representing their religion properly on account of their sexual
choices, they may feel ashamed or guilty about of their sexual experiences (Jardin,
Sharp, Garey & Zvolensky, 2016). Moore et al. (2015), explored an African
American Christian church-based youth group to understand the messages about
sex the youth were receiving from their parents and church. They found participants
to be at sexual risk based on their reported sexual behavior. Participants reported
high levels of organized religiosity (e.g., frequent attendance to church and church
involvement) and high levels of subjective religiosity (e.g., thinking about God,
praying outside of church, and reading scriptures outside of church), but about onethird reported vaginal sex experience at about 14.7 years of age and were
inconsistent with condom use. While the church spoke against premarital sex and
deemed it as sinful or wrong, participants felt that the God they ascribed to was
loving and supportive of their own decision-making; participants felt no reported
upset about their sexuality and sexual experiences. Therefore, participants’ sexual
affect was overall positive (Moore et al., 2015). The sexual experiences of the
participants caused them to personalize and reconcile religious messages they were
receiving if they differed with those of the church and religious leaders (Moore et
al., 2015).
Higher levels of religiosity delay sexual behavior, but once an individual
engages in sexual behavior, levels of religiosity might lessen, showing that sexual
behavior may influence attitudes of religion, not because they chose to stop being
religious, but because social support is lacking (Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh,
2014). Using longitudinal data from before first sexual intercourse to after first
sexual intercourse, Vasilenko et al. (2014) investigated the importance of religion
(i.e., subjective religiosity) and attendance at religious services (i.e., organized
religiosity) to determine if there were fluctuations in either of these two facets of
religiosity. Generally, for both aspects, participants’ religiosity levels did not
change within 6 months of reported first sexual intercourse, but within a year of
reported first sexual intercourse, levels of importance and service attendance
decreased. Participants who continued engaging in sexual behavior inconsistent
with religious doctrine experienced shameful sexual affect, which caused a
decrease in service attendance.
Many religions speak against premarital sexual behavior and promote
heterosexual relationships over homosexual relationships (Altemeyer, 2004;
Barnes & Meyer, 2012; Regnerus, 2007; Sherry et al., 2010; Vasilenko &
Lefkowitz, 2014). Today, many people are beginning to accept the idea of sexuality
being fluid or being able to explore one’s sexual preferences whether it be lesbian,
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gay, or bisexual. In such cases, their religious identities may be at odds with sexual
identity (Sherry, Adelman, Whilde, & Quick, 2010). Sherry and colleagues found
that levels of negative and shameful sexual affect were reported when participants
self-defined as religious while participating in homosexual behavior. Participants
who were prepared to explain their sexual experiences to their religious community
often felt rejection and exclusion from the community (Sherry et al., 2010). An
African American male participant journaled,
[W]hen I realized that I was ultimately going to fail being heterosexual, and
sleep with a man, I tried to kill myself by smashing my car into a bridge
pylon. No one figured it was a suicide attempt I guess because I was let right
out of the hospital as soon as they decided I didn’t have a concussion. I then
decided that I could not be homosexual AND Christian, and dropped out of
all church services (Sherry et al., p. 116, 2010).
A negative or shameful sexual affect can cause a decrease in organized religious
activity (Barnes & Meyer, 2012; Sherry et al., 2010).
A similar study by Quinn, Dickson-Gomez, and Kelly (2016), involving
African American males who reported homosexual behavior, found that
participants felt the need to stay physically present in church because of significant
organized religiosity as a youth. Generally, all participants saw their church as a
“church family,” recognized homosexuality as being against the beliefs of the
church, and experienced their sexuality as a topic of gossip at the church (Quinn et
al., 2016). A participant said, “If God created everyone how they are, perfectly,
like, he doesn’t make mistakes as people,” (Quinn et al., 2016, p. 533). Participants
often felt guilt or shame based upon their sexual decisions and sexuality but did not
want to depart from their church families; therefore, they tailored their religiosity
to reconcile their sexuality by postulating that their sexuality is not a mistake.
African American pastors were also interviewed to explain their stance on
conflicting views of religion and sexuality. A reverend stated,
[A]ll I can say is what the Bible says relative to that lifestyle and the Bible
refers to it as an abomination. Now, I don’t take that and beat them over the
head with it. I tell them God loves them. He loves the criminals, the
murderers, he loves all people. And he can change them (Quinn et al., 2016,
p. 533).
Religiosity can influence the sexual affect of African Americans because it
becomes salient when the religious community from which they are conditioned to
receive love and acceptance is now gossiping, looking down on, and in some cases,
rejecting them because of their sexual decisions and sexuality.
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The Current Study
This correlational study assessed how organized and subjective religiosity
predicted African American individuals experiencing positive, negative, or
shameful sexual affect. Previous research has focused on sexual health as
quantifiable variables like contraception usage, quantity of sexual partners, or
frequency of STI testing; however, a comprehensive sexual health assessment must
include subjective emotions. Organized religiosity and subjective religiosity were
chosen to predict sexual affect because, as an ethnic group, African Americans
historically and repeatedly report religiosity at increased levels over other ethnic
groups (Taylor & Chatters, 2010). A sample of self-identified African Americans
answered a comprehensive survey that included questions about their organized
religiosity, subjective religiosity, and experiences of positive, negative, and
shameful sexual affects. The first hypothesis was that higher levels of subjective
religiosity will be positively correlated with positive sexual affect, but negatively
correlated with negative and shameful affects. The second hypothesis was that
organized religiosity would be negatively correlated with positive sexual affect, but
would be positively correlated with shameful and negative affects. On account of
the more personal aspect of subjective religiosity, it was hypothesized that
subjective religiosity would have more influence on sexual affect than organized
religiosity.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from a large Midwestern university. Participants
were contacted through introductory psychology courses and African American
and Hispanic/Latino students were directly recruited from the campus registrar
during 2005 to 2010. The ethnic representation of the university population at the
time was 65% European American, 12.1% Asian American, 5.8% African
American, and 4.1% Hispanic American. From the larger sample, 725 participants
reported to be African American with 72.8% females and 27.2% males. The
participants ranged from ages 18 to 24 years (M = 19.95, SD = 1.31). All were
undergraduate students, and class year was not collected. From the larger sample,
80.7% reported to be exclusively heterosexual, 1.3% reported exclusively
homosexual behavior, and 1% reported some homosexual behavior. Some
participants declined to report sexual orientation.
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Measures
Sexual affect. This measure assessed experiences of sexual affect or
emotions in regards to their own sexual experiences. This included 16 adjectives to
describe sexual affect (e.g. satisfied, frustrated, ashamed). Participants indicated
their levels of emotion experienced about their current sexual experiences and
behaviors on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0= “not at all” to 4= “a lot.” A
principle component factor analysis (utilizing Oblimin rotation) showed a 3-factor
structure. Then reliability analyses were conducted to corroborate the three
subscales: positive (α = .91; 6 items; “satisfied”), negative (α = .85; 5 items,
“frustrated”), and shame (α = .78; 3 items, “ashamed”). Reported higher scores
showed that the affect was experienced concerning their own sexuality and sexual
behavior.
Religiosity and Spirituality. The Religiosity and Spirituality measure
(Mattis, Hearn, & Jagers, 2002) was intended to assess participants’ attitudes
towards religion, personal involvement, and how they felt about religion as children
which was interpreted by four subscales. For this study, the two subscales or
Subjective Religiosity and Organizational Religious Involvement were utilized.
Pertaining to subjective religiosity, participants selected the response that best
related with their feelings and beliefs about religiosity and spirituality on a 5-point
Likert scale 1= “not at all important” to 5= “very important” regarding their
subjective religiosity (α = .89; 4 items; “how important is religion in your life
today?”) to understand how they felt about using religion in their daily lives. Higher
scores indicated that participants found religion to be important an important aspect
in their lives—from daily prayer to reading Scriptures, all of these activities were
done on their own accord outside of an institution.
To measure participants’ organizational religious involvement (α = .74; 9
items), they circled “yes” or “no” to questions such as, “are you are member of a
church or religious institution” and “do you presently hold a leadership role in a
religious institution?” A mean of the number of “yes” responses was created to rate
organizational involvement, which could have included having a leadership role in
the religious institution, regularly attendance weekly, or involvement in a religious
group (that may not be an institution, but a group with a common religious aspect).
Procedure
The data were taken from a larger ongoing study on positive sex and gender
socialization in undergraduates. Approval for the study was obtained from the
Institutional Review Board at the university of its origin. The participant’s grade
was contingent upon completion of the study, but there was an alternative writing
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option for those who chose to not participate. Data were collected from 2005 to
2010 during each academic semester and successfully received a large portion of
African American participants, though all non-Caucasian students were encouraged
to participate.
The duration of each session lasted approximately 45 minutes to one hour,
with five to 10 participants per session. Participants were informed that they could
ask questions or skip any question that they did not want to answer. After indicating
willingness to participate on consent forms, they were given questionnaire packets.
Then a debriefing form was given to each participant giving information about the
study and the questions they had answered.
Results
Overview of Plan of Analysis
Descriptive analyses were completed to evaluate the means of continuous
variables and frequencies of categorical variables. Then inferential statistics were
conducted to test hypotheses. Analyses focused on participants’ sexual affect in
regards to their levels of subjective religiosity and organized religion. Utilizing
correlational analyses, relationships between sexual affect (positive, negative, and
shameful) and religiosity (subjective and organized) were investigated. By
conducting Pearson correlations, to note if positive, negative, or shameful sexual
affect was related with either or both subjective and organized religiosity, none of
the sentiments regarding sexual affect were significantly correlated with organized
religiosity (Table 1). After finding significance between the positive and negative
sexual affects and subjective religiosity, a regression model was created to better
understand what influenced the positive and negative sexual affects (Table 2).
Characteristics of Sample
Through descriptive analysis, it was found that the sample of African
Americans was highly religious. Notably, 74% of participants reported some type
of subjective religiosity and 71% reported some type of organized religiosity. Table
1 shows demographic sexual factors that influenced sexual affect in this sample
were age in years at first sexual experience (N = 14.1), if contraception was used at
last intercourse, and ties to ethnic identity.
Subjective Religiosity and Sexual Affect
It was hypothesized that higher levels of subjective religiosity would be
positively correlated with a higher positive sexual affect but would be negatively
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correlated with shameful and negative affects. Thus, subjective religiosity was a
predictor of positive sexual affect. As can be seen in Table 2, Pearson correlations
indicated that a positive sexual affect is positively correlated with higher levels of
subjective religiosity (r = .11, p = .02). Additionally, subjective religiosity is
negatively correlated with negative sexual affect (r = -.11, p = .02),partially
supporting hypothesis 1. Although subjective religiosity had significant
correlations with positive and negative sexual affects, there was no significant
correlation between subjective religiosity and a shameful sexual affect.
Organized Religiosity and Sexual Affect
It was hypothesized that organized religiosity would be negatively
correlated with positive sexual affect and would be positively correlated with
shameful and negative sexual affects. The second hypothesis was not supported.
Therefore, organized religiosity was not a predictor of shameful or negative sexual
affects. Table 2 depicts that no significant correlations were present.
Demographic Factors that Influence Sexual Affect
Because subjective religiosity has a more personal aspect than organized
religiosity, it was hypothesized that subjective religiosity would be more influential
in determining positive and negative sexual affects than organized religiosity. Table
2 shows that organized religiosity had no significant correlation with sexual affect;
therefore, organized religiosity was not included in the regression analysis model,
and the third hypothesis of subjective religiosity being more predictive than
organized religiosity was supported. To further understand what influenced sexual
affect among the sample, a regression model was created including demographic
factors that were significantly correlated with positive, negative, or shameful sexual
affect (Table 1).
Table 3 shows the results of a regression analysis model to address this
hypothesis. The Pearson correlation also indicates other factors that influence
sexual affect. (e.g., age of first intercourse, ethnic identity, reported levels of
depression, and subjective religiosity).
Again, there were no significance in any correlations with organized
religiosity, so it was not included in the regression analysis model since it does not
have any influence or predictive value in this sample’s sexual affect. Other than
subjective religiosity, ethnic identity, age of first sexual experience, experience of
depression, and the use of contraception at last sexual encounter were significant
correlations that were controlled for in the model. Overall, controlling for 4 sexual
factors contributed an additional .54% to 1.2% of variance for positive sexual affect
and .50 to 1.19% of variance for negative sexual affect.
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Table 1. Bivariate Correlations Between Demographic Variable to Predict Positive
and Negative Sexual Affect.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
Age at first sexual
-.06 .11*
.03
.08
.12
experience
.27**
2
Subjective Religiosity
-.07
.12* .24* -.11* .11*
*
3
Used contraception at
-.09
.04
.05
last intercourse
.17**
4
Ethnic identity
-.12* .23**
.17**
5
Reported depression
--.31* .42**
6
Positive Sexual Affect
-.17**
7 Negative Sexual Affect
-**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Between Subjective Religiosity, Organized
Religiosity Negative Sexual Affect, Shameful Sexual Affect, and Positive Sexual
Affect.
1
2
3
4
5
1
Negative Sexual Affect
-- .67*
-.45**
-.11*
-.04
2
3
4
5

Shameful Sexual Affect
Positive Sexual Affect
Subjective Religiosity
Organized Religiosity

--

-.51**
--

.00
.11*
--

.08
.06
.60**
--

**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level
Table 3. Regression Analyses Predicting which Factors are Most Influential in
Predicting Positive and Negative Sexual Affects.
Positive Sexual Affect
Negative Sexual Affect
Age at first sexual
-.27**
.12
experience
Subjective religiosity
.11*
-.11*
Used contraception at
.05
-.17**
last intercourse
Ethnic identity
.23**
-.16**
Reported depression
.31**
.42**
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Table 3. (Continued)
Adjusted R2
.054
F
1.444*
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level

.118
2.033**

Discussion
This study sought to investigate the role of organized religiosity and
subjective religiosity in predicting emotions about sexual experiences among
African Americans. In particular, organized religiosity focused on the element of
frequency of attendance to religious services and regular involvement with
religious extracurricular activities, but subjective religiosity was focused on taking
the elements learned during attendance to religious services and activities and using
the morals learned outside of the church walls for personal growth, gain, and
sustainability. In other words, subjective religiosity is how an individual chooses to
implement religion during their daily lives without formally or physically going to
church.
As expected, it was found that participants who practiced subjective
religiosity felt positively about their sexual experiences. But, most surprising was
that organized religiosity had a negligible role in predicting sexual affect in this
sample, even though much of the existing literature suggested that organized
religiosity can be a reoccurring factor for African Americans experiencing negative
or shameful sentiments about their sexual experiences. If participants had their first
sexual experience at a younger age, their sexual affect was usually negative. On the
other hand, if reported contraception was used during last intercourse and if
participants had a strong sense of ethnic identity, their sexual affect was usually
positive.
Subjective Religiosity as a Predictor of Positive Sexual Affect
A common theme from our analyses was, like historical evidence shows,
that African Americans in our study found religion to be important for daily life.
Many implemented regular prayer and Scripture readings on their own accord. This
one-on-one time spent forging a relationship with the deity to whom they worship
could have resulted in validating and feeling confident about their sexual
experiences. Subjective religiosity predicted positive emotions concerning sexual
experiences, which is positive sexual affect. If there were negative emotions felt
about their sexual experiences, it was useful to combat negative emotions about
sexual experiences with the principles of subjective religiosity.
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Organized Religiosity and Sexual Affect
A possible explanation for subjective religiosity, rather than organized
religiosity, being a predictive factor of sexual affect in this sample is that sexual
experiences and subjective religiosity both involve personal decision-making. For
example, if a religious African American individual decides to engage in
homosexual behavior, they can internally validate the sexual behavior through
subjective religiosity. The individual can decide that, personally, their religion does
not hinder them from pursuing these sexual experiences.
Limitations and Further Implications
Although our findings presented essential steps to understanding what
religious aspects can help facilitate positive emotions about sexual experiences in
the African American community, there are some limitations that contextualize our
results. First, we did not examine what religious messages participants were
receiving from religious institutions. Second, our sample was predominately
females, so it is unclear how applicable our results are to African American males.
For future research, it would be useful to understand what facets of subjective
religiosity (e.g., prayer, personal reconciliation, Scripture reading) are helpful in
predicting positive sexual affect. Although subjective religiosity was more
predictive of sexual affect, it remains imperative to understand the effects that
predominately African American religious institutions have on the community in
generating sexual affect.
As a way to shift previous research from sexual health research that tends
to focus on the many sexual risk factors that African Americans face, it is crucial
to apply religiosity, which is historically advantageous for African Americans,
making it a suitable factor for predicting positive sexual affect, which in return
might facilitate holistic sexual health. When, as a community, African Americans
are encouraged to feel positive about their unique sexual experiences, a comfortable
culture in speaking positively about sex and sexuality is created.
Religious institutions that are predominately African American can be a
practical community starting point to begin positive socialization about sex and
sexuality. Socializing or speaking positively about sex and sexuality means that an
individual is able to be assertive about protected sex, express what is needed to feel
comfortable in a sexual situation, and clearly convey unwanted sexual experiences
(Hobern, 2014). Nurturing positive feelings about sexual experiences within
African American religious communities through acceptance and honest
communication can place African Americans at an advantage for achieving greater
holistic sexual health.
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Quiet: The Power of Introverts in
a World That Can't Stop Talking:
A Book Analysis
Molly Goaley
Abstract
The topics addressed in Susan Cain’s Quiet are important to nonscholarly and
academic audiences because introversion is a universal personality trait that affects
us all in some way. If we are not introverts ourselves, we have colleagues,
supervisors, family members, friends or children who are. Studies of extroversion
and introversion in organizational teamwork (Zanin & Bisel, 2018), office
environments (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), and leadership (Grant et al., 2011)
therefore have practical implications regardless of personality type. The purpose of
this paper is to compare and contrast Cain’s work with the existing scholarly
research in order to gain a deeper understanding of introversion’s role in the
workplace, as well as identify limitations in the research literature.
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Introverts living under the Extrovert Ideal are like women in a man’s world,
discounted because of a trait that goes to the core of who they are.
Extroversion is an enormously appealing personality style, but we’ve turned
it into an oppressive standard to which most of us feel we must conform
(Cain, 2012, p. 4).
These are the sentences that introduce Susan Cain’s (2012) passionately
argued and expertly researched book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World
That Can’t Stop Talking. At least one third of the people we know are introverts:
those who listen intently (Grant, Gino & Hofmann, 2011) and concentrate best in
quiet spaces (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), who prefer working individually more
than on teams (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2018), and who dislike self-promotion
and attention (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009) but thrive on focused conversations. Cain
argues that we dramatically undervalue this creative, self-motivated personality
type (Hazel, Keaten & Kelly, 2014) and that we lose much in our organizations by
doing so. Even in less obvious introverted occupations like law, politics and
activism, she argues that some of the biggest leaps forward were made by people
who “achieved what they did, not in spite of, but because of their introversion”
(Cain, 2012, p. 6).
Cain addresses the rise of what she calls the Extrovert Ideal, or the
omnipresent belief that the ideal self is gregarious, alpha and comfortable being the
center of attention. She explains that our cultural focus on extroversion permeates
our organizations to the point that introversion has become a second-class
personality trait, “somewhere between a disappointment and a pathology” (Cain,
2012, p. 4). To embrace the Extrovert Ideal so unthinkingly is a costly mistake, as
we miss out on the significant contributions that come from introverts who create
and innovate by tapping into their inner worlds. The “New Groupthink” structure,
or the idea that teamwork should be elevated above all else, stifles productivity for
those who need solitude to get the real work done (Cain, 2012, p. 75). Additionally,
failure to recognize the potential of introverts in leadership roles is a major
disservice to organizations, as less extroverted leaders are more apt to listen to
employees’ ideas and consider their opinions in decision-making (Grant et al.,
2011).
The topics addressed in Quiet are important to nonscholarly and academic
audiences because introversion is a universal personality trait that affects us all in
some way. If we are not introverts ourselves, we have colleagues, supervisors,
family members, friends or children who are. Studies of extroversion and
introversion in organizational teamwork (Zanin & Bisel, 2018), office
environments (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), and leadership (Grant et al., 2011)
therefore have practical implications regardless of personality type. The purpose of
this paper is to compare and contrast Cain’s work with the existing scholarly
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research in order to gain a deeper understanding of introversion’s role in the
workplace, as well as identify limitations in the research literature. I will focus on
Quiet’s concepts of teamwork, leadership, communication styles and physical
environments by providing a literature review regarding introversion in
organizational communication and conclude with an evaluation and critique of the
book.
Author and Book
Author Biographical Sketch
Susan Cain is a self-described introvert who brings a wealth of personal and
professional experience to Quiet. She is the chief revolutionary behind Quiet
Revolution and the author of two bestsellers, Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a
World That Can’t Stop Talking and Quiet Power: The Secret Strengths of
Introverts.
A former Wall Street lawyer, Cain was inspired to write Quiet after noticing
the vast amounts of untapped potential that existed in personality types like hers in
the workplace. For Cain, Quiet is not just a book but a mission to change how we
think about introversion; to reshape workplace culture and design; and to steer away
from groupthink in favor of environments that support deep reflection and focus.
In addition to writing, Cain is now a public speaker on the topic of introversion and
her record-breaking TED Talk has been viewed more than 19 million times (Cain,
2012).
Cain is influenced by the idea that introverts are constantly being forced to
engage in practices that go against their innate nature and have been doing so their
whole lives. She is particularly interested in empowering introverted children, as
well as educating parents and teachers about their unique needs. She deliberately
uses “introversion” as a broad term, drawing insight from Big Five psychology,
Carl Jung, Jerome Kagan, Elaine Aron, and many other scholars and researchers
(Cain, 2012, p. 269-270).
Book Summary
Quiet is written in a style that appeals to readers of all types, is thoroughly
supported by research, and offers many true stories of unforgettable introverts like
Rosa Parks, Warren Buffett, and Steve Wozniak. The book’s main arguments focus
on the following ideas: that much of the world embraces the Extrovert Ideal and
thus undervalues introversion, and that today’s schools and organizations neglect
to provide an environment in which introverts can thrive and produce their best
work.

78

Quiet is broken into four parts based on the following concepts: the
Extrovert Ideal, biology as it relates to temperament, introversion as it relates to
culture, and introversion as it relates to communication and relationships.
Part One explores how extroversion rose to become the cultural ideal, as
well as the history and shortcomings of charismatic leadership. As American
culture increasingly came to idolize the Cult of Personality over time, biases toward
extroversion intensified. Early citizens of our country depended on our founding
fathers to be “loudmouths” about liberty, while qualities of the more reserved were
regarded with a growing disdain (Cain, 2012, p. 30). As a culture, we have been
taught to idolize the charismatic, while qualities of introversion (e.g., being softspoken or contemplative) have traditionally been viewed as weaknesses. This
section concludes with a critique of what Cain calls the “New Groupthink,” the idea
that our best and most creative work comes solely from collaboration (Cain, 2012,
p. 75). Cain adamantly makes the point that for at least one third of the population
(introverts), solitude is a vital key to creativity. While school systems and
organizations should be teaching people to work independently and providing
plenty of space for solitude, they increasingly do the opposite. Moreover, when
organizations force members to participate in groupthink and teamwork above all
else, it consequentially stifles productivity and intellectual achievement for many
(Cain, 2012).
Part Two transitions into biology’s role in temperament and how free will
can be channeled into making the naturally introverted more comfortable in
communicating. Cain explores developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan’s work
regarding high and low reactivity in infants, which provides a tremendous amount
of evidence that high reactivity is one biological basis of introversion (Cain, 2012).
The temperament we are born with, Cain concludes, mixed with cultural and life
experience, forms our individual personality and our likeliness to be introverted or
extroverted.
Part Three explores Cain’s concept of “soft power” in the context of AsianAmericans navigating the Extrovert Ideal, and how culture plays a role in the way
we perceive personality type. Without encouraging rigid national or ethnic
stereotyping, Cain acknowledges the cultural differences in personality between
East and West, and how qualities of introversion are often revered in Asian
countries (Cain, 2012).
Part Four concludes the book by offering advice to introverts on when to
act more extroverted, how to address the communication gap between the opposite
types, and perhaps most importantly, how to empower quiet children. Introverted
youth, she argues, are typically encouraged by well-meaning parents and teachers
to act against their nature in social situations. By allowing quiet children to be
themselves, however, we empower them with the confidence necessary to navigate
the world in meaningful ways (Cain, 2012)
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Quiet is heavily researched, with Cain citing 271 total sources in the notes
section of the book. She supports her conclusions with a plethora of academic
literature in psychology, sociology, and communication. In addition, she offers
many anecdotal stories from popular biographies and autobiographies on introverts
such as Warren Buffett, Eleanor Roosevelt, Mahatma Gandhi, Bill Gates, and
others.
Literature Review and Evaluation
Though Quiet explores introversion mainly through the lenses of
psychological and social sciences, the book’s concepts go hand-in-hand with
organizational communication. The following section will focus on relevant and
contemporary research related to these concepts and will compare and contrast the
literature to Cain’s work.
Major Concepts
Teamwork, leadership, communication style, and environment are main
concepts found within contemporary research related to introversion in
organizational communication.
Teamwork (e.g., group work, brainstorming) is based on the idea that
collective action and thought processing are more effective and efficient than
individual thought and action. Additionally, as dependence on teams has increased
in organizations, research has begun to examine the role of leadership in fostering
team success (Morgeson, DeRue & Karam, 2010). However, extroversion’s role in
team satisfaction has been found to be insignificant (Medina & Srivastava, 2016).
Contrarily, despite its widespread use in organizations, social scientific research
has generally been unsupportive of the claimed benefits of brainstorming
(Henningsen & Henningsen, 2018).
It has long been assumed that extroversion and personality trait dominance
are indicators of effective leadership. While true in some cases, existing literature
increasingly proves the opposite. Anderson and Kilduff (2009) suggest that
dominant individuals tend to display competence-related communication cues –
such as assertiveness, direct eye contact, and expansive posture – regardless of their
actual level of competence. These cues in turn shape others’ perceptions of the
dominant individual as self-confident and highly capable of managing tasks,
therefore allowing the individual to achieve influence over groups. If highly
dominant individuals are perceived as competent regardless of ability to accomplish
tasks, this suggests that competent individuals who display low dominance can be
unjustifiably overlooked for certain positions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).
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The way introverts and extroverts vary in communication style has a strong
impact on the effectiveness of messaging (O’Carroll, 2015). Within the context of
organizations, group members’ collective understanding is improved when they
have similar expectations about the appropriate way to communicate with one
another (Park, 2008). In turn, group communication research could benefit from
understanding more introverted qualities of communication style, such as
politeness and efficiency, and applying them to a group work context (Park, 2008).
Finally, the environment of an organization has a strong effect on how
different personality types communicate and accomplish work (Real et al., 2017).
While organizations increasingly adopt open office structures to reduce costs and
foster collaboration, employees are affected quite differently depending on a variety
of factors such as age, espoused values and personality type (McElroy & Morrow,
2010). While one individual may thrive in an open office environment, another may
feel constantly distracted and as a result, become ineffective.
Evaluation
Quiet’s main concepts compare well with those found in the research
literature, especially in terms of undervaluing introversion’s role in the workplace.
Cain claims that the New Groupthink overstates the value of working in teams
rather than individually, which is supported by a number of studies. For example,
Zanin & Bisel (2018) illustrate employees’ need for autonomy, often best achieved
by working alone, in order to negotiate identity and shape their organizational
experience.
Cain emphasizes the power of quiet leadership and how embracing
introversion’s traits in leadership roles can provide tremendous value to
organizations. In line with this view, research indicates that less extroverted leaders
are more apt to listen to employees’ ideas, involve them in decision-making, and
make them feel like a valued part of the organization (Grant et al., 2011). Such
behaviors benefit organizations by empowering employees to be more proactive
and stake a greater claim in the organization’s success.
Cain asserts that introverts exhibit a higher level of sensitivity among
groups, and therefore demonstrate a greater need for deep, one-on-one
communication style as opposed to group conversation. Similarly, Ervin et al.
(2017) suggest that task accomplishment is improved when meetings are structured
by topical expertise rather than letting the most dominant or extroverted
personalities take the lead.
Cain consistently emphasizes the need for introverts to have quiet spaces,
such as closed office structures, in which to be productive. Many studies
substantiate this claim, indicating that office structure is a key factor in
accomplishing tasks. For example, McElroy and Morrow’s (2010) study illustrates
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how employees will have very different reactions to open versus closed office
structures based on a number of variables (e.g., personality type, age).
Although the concepts in Quiet align well with the research literature, there
are also substantial differences that should be addressed. Cain argues the many
benefits of working individually, yet largely disregards the vast amount of research
that points to the value of teamwork on organizational outcomes. For example, one
survey of high-level managers reported that 91 percent of them agreed that teams
are central to organizational success (Martin & Bal, 2006, as cited in Morgeson et
al., 2010). This suggests a high level of value in teamwork, regardless of personality
type.
Cain’s concept of quiet leadership is indeed an undervalued attribute in
organizations, yet she fails to address instances of when it is better to have
extroverted leaders at the helm. For example, Grant et al. (2011) suggest that
employees who are less proactive respond to and accomplish tasks more efficiently
under extroverted managers. Communication behavior and style is a major concept
explored throughout Quiet, however it gives little mention of technology’s role as
a communication channel and introverts’ level of satisfaction with it. As
organizations increasingly depend on online communication for both daily
operations and team projects (Medina & Srivastava, 2016), this area warrants
further research.
The final contrast pertains to Cain’s claim that quiet work spaces are a vital
key to creativity for introverts. However, research has shown that open office
spaces have been effective in increasing collaboration, employee altruism, and
company support (McElroy & Morrow, 2010). Quiet makes the case for more
autonomous work spaces in schools and organizations yet does not address the
values of open office structures.
Critique
As clearly indicated in Quiet and supported by the research literature,
society would be wise to tap into the power of introverted personalities. Quiet offers
an insightful look into the benefits of introversion for both nonacademic and
academic audiences.
The layperson will find the concepts in Quiet relatable, as we all have
colleagues, friends, and loved ones who are introverted and many of us are
introverts ourselves. Perhaps the largest benefit to the layperson is that the book is
thoroughly supported by research yet is not bogged down with complicated
academic language. It is presented in a simple style with many interesting examples
from real-life introverts. It provides a tremendous amount of insight into how this
personality type communicates while still being enjoyable to read.
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A potential weakness is that Quiet sometimes fails to address when it is
better to lean on extroverted personality types in certain situations. A section on
extroverted leadership’s role in combat or crisis situations, for example, would add
value to Cain’s arguments by adding a contrasting perspective.
A major benefit of Quiet is that it offers insight of this personality type from
an introvert’s perspective. Remarkably, while a plethora of research is said to exist
on extroversion and introversion, many of the studies found for this project focused
primarily on the perspective of extroversion (Hazel et al., 2014). This indicates a
greater need for more research that specifically examines introversion, which Cain
does well. A potential weakness is that academics may be frustrated by Cain’s
failure to acknowledge the benefits of extroversion that abound in scholarly
research (Grant et al., 2011). While the book’s intentions are to provide insight
specifically on introversion, Cain’s arguments could be more beneficial if they
offered a contrasting perspective.
Overall, I would rate Quiet with four out of five starts and label it a mustread for anyone who identifies as or knows an introvert (which is everyone). My
rating is based on how I felt when reading this book. I personally identified and
agreed with nearly every point that Cain made in her arguments, and came away
with a better understanding of myself and how to communicate better with others.
I would absolutely recommend Quiet to my classmates. Not only does it provide a
wealth of information about people in general, it relates to a multitude of concepts
we have explored in organizational communication. Managers and employees alike
could become better communicators simply by understanding the differences
between introverts and extroverts.
Conclusion
A major takeaway is that Cain clearly points out society’s tendency to
embrace the Extrovert Ideal and downplay the positive aspects of introversion.
Remarkably, much of the existing scholarly research also has a tendency to focus
on the negative or stereotypical aspects of introversion. Dismissing the power of
introversion so unthinkingly does a major disservice to society. Additionally, there
is a critical need for schools and organizations to shift toward understanding and
supporting this personality type through consideration of leadership roles, working
environments, etc. By letting introverts be themselves instead of pressing them to
conform to a certain standard, our work lives could be much improved.
In conclusion, Quiet is a remarkably insightful book that successfully makes
the case for embracing the power of introversion, especially in organizational
settings. Thanks to researchers like Cain and others, there has been a recent,
significant shift in our perception of introverts and their capabilities. However,
there is still much work to be done in empowering introverts, especially in
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leadership roles, and allowing them to reach their true potential through embracing
their unique needs.
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Book Review of King & Etty's
England and Scotland, 1286-1603
Austin M. Setter
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Andy King and Claire Etty. England and Scotland, 1286-1603. London: Palgrave,
2016. Pp. ix, 236. $104.00.
Authors Andy King, lecturer in history at the University of Southampton,
and Claire Etty, senior assistant researcher at the Oxford English Dictionary, came
together to write a new book in the ongoing series British History in Perspective.
Their book, England and Scotland, 1286-1603, acts as an easy to read introduction
to and current synthesis on the relationship between England and Scotland from
Alexander III’s death (1286) to the ascension of Scotland’s King James VI to the
English throne (1603). Through this synthesis, the authors successfully provided an
introductory text accessible for non-academics and entry-level historians while also
subtly answering questions concerning the period such as what prevented peace,
how the relationship influenced each society, and how could a Scottish king rise to
power on the English throne after 250 years of constant war.
The book began with a brief historiographical section that addressed the
regular English bias due to the availability of extant medieval sources. Following
that, it traced the trends of the field that culminated in what King and Etty argued
is the current romanticized idea of the relationship between England and Scotland.
They explained that this relationship was heavily based on surviving notions from
the historiographical traditions of both Whiggish and Romantic history. Thus, King
and Etty, in the writing of this book, attempted to offer a more holistic interpretation
of medieval relations based on both primary and secondary source material that
would also appeal to a wide audience. Their hope was to provide the foundation for
a better understanding of the complexities of the English-Scottish relationship
throughout history that is not beholden to Scottish nationalism or English
overlordship but instead is based on an analysis of their relationship with one
another, as well as with the rest of the world, throughout history.
King and Etty defined their book’s scope of time between the death of
Alexander III, and Britain’s renewed claim to overlordship of Scotland, and the
ascension of Scotland’s King James VI to the English throne. This selection offers
over 300 years of relations to explore, all of which led King and Etty to conclude
that the Anglo-Scottish relationship depended heavily on the Anglo-French
relationship first and later the French-Hapsburg. Within this frame of reference
Scotland and England defined themselves socially, politically, and religiously
depending on the power and relevance of the kingdom of France. Scotland defined
their relationship with England as one of oppression and unwarranted involvement
and would take advantage of war between England and France to expand their
holdings; however, England defined their relationship with Scotland in the context
of overlordship of Britain and would actively engage in war with Scotland when
they were not at war with France. These shifting relations enabled Scotland to
conduct opportunistic raids and prevented England from fully subjugating their
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northern neighbor. Towards the end of the book, the French relationship was
redefined as France attempted to impress themselves upon Scottish rule and
Scotland and England grew closer through their acceptance of Protestantism, which
culminated in the unchallenged ascension of the king of Scotland to the English
throne.
The book’s chosen timeframe worked perfectly for King and Etty’s
examination. It excluded the relations before 1286 as Alexander III’s death sparked
renewed English involvement in Scottish rule, and the timeframe ends with the
ascension of Scotland’s king to the English throne, an event that shifted the
interactions between the two kingdoms. The timeframe also allowed King and Etty
to develop their argument/synthesis in an easy-flowing historical narrative that was
inviting to those with little to no experience in the field as well as those newly
established within the field. They complemented this narrative with a thematic
examination in the second part of their book focused on specific types of interaction
such as armies and warfare, relations between peoples, and national identity and
propaganda. These areas provided a more complex look at how England and
Scotland interacted throughout the chosen years and how the history of their
interactions both influenced and continue to influence modern England and
Scotland.
In keeping with their easy-to-access approach, King and Etty relied on
endnotes as opposed to footnotes giving the readers a more uniform structure
throughout the book. They also provided useful maps and both Scottish and English
succession charts to help familiarize the reader with the many names and family
connections. This approach continued into the bibliography and was one of the few
criticisms of the work. While it was helpful by pointing towards other, more
specialized secondary works, it would have benefitted greatly from a brief
discussion or list of the most common primary sources for the benefit of new
scholars.
Overall, King and Etty presented an easy to read history of English-Scottish
interactions throughout the late Middle Ages. Their book provided not only a
synthesis of the previous research but also a thematic approach that opened new
questions and possibilities for research. The book succeeded in examining the
questions of why peace was unobtainable and how the relationship shifted to allow
for the king of Scotland to ascend the English throne. It also outlined
inconsistencies that help further develop the framework for new research into
medieval border communities, use of the medieval past, and the role of medieval
Scotland in a global setting.
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Autumn
Steven J. Maloney
Autumn

Crossing the bridge from summer to winter
like some obscure Hokusai, a Keats Ode
rings in the mists of memory; the road
not taken beckons, its damp leaves colder
than before. Musty texts read well again,
and sweet cooking smells waft through my window,
bringing a bright moon along now and then,
(honored guest), while gull anthems presage snow.
That old saint under the bridge doesn’t seem
to care he’ll be needing blankets soon; he
just sits there, paper in hand, glad to see
the passing show, knowing it’s all a dream.
Autumn: a return to where we’ve once been,
a time to ponder the spaces between.
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Sweet Avaline
Tavia Lloyd
Sweet Avaline
This world doesn’t deserve you but the earth will preserve your every step
Every breath in you take will be a breath out of love I’ll leave in the air for you
To breathe in kindness and taste laughter in the little lungs your chest confides
I will nourish your self-worth and teach you confidence to feel for centuries
I’ll teach you the beauty of stillness and how colors sound in the night
I will grow trees of compassion and history for you to read through in its roots
I’ll play movement for you so you can experience
the fluid motion of body and mind
I will bake love and wisdom into foods so divine you’ll crave
the goodness of soul
I’ll lift you high in the air to feel raindrop bliss on your plush colored skin
At bedtime I’ll hold you while reading from trees
of various knowledge and talents that go unseen
At night I’ll listen to the sound of your slumber
while I smile in the mist of your wonderous dreams
I’ll teach you the gifts of the earth and the elation
of hearts beating to the ravine of humility
I will build curiosity out of the night stars above
you teaching you the way of constellations
I’ll show you the bravery and courage of strong people
someday you might idolize
People from all nations, all talents, all intellects and feverish might
You’ll teach me to love the simplicity in life
and the present moment you gift into my sight
Sweet Avaline, I cannot wait to teach you such marvelous things.
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Laws of Genetics
Sydney N. Sheltz-Kempf
Laws of Genetics

My life is a concoction of chromosomes,
a carefully controlled mishmash of heterochromatin and
euchromatin intoxicated on a cocktail of power chased with
genius, declaring I am legally bound by laws
of genetics which I never had the right to vote on.
Society feasts on my spaghetti strands of DNA and
nicknames me Pinocchio while they independently assort
who I am and what I must be into boxes.
I settle for an equal segregation of my talents and my dreams
with no regard for any nurturing that my biological
mother could have done – but never did.
Nature is a terrible mother
but at least she tells me
exactly who I am.
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